Medical Necessity Determinations:  The Need for a Legal Structure by Hirshfeld, Edward B.
Health Matrix: The Journal of Law-
Medicine
Volume 6 | Issue 1
1996
Medical Necessity Determinations: The Need for a
Legal Structure
Edward B. Hirshfeld
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarlycommons.law.case.edu/healthmatrix
Part of the Health Law and Policy Commons
This Symposium is brought to you for free and open access by the Student Journals at Case Western Reserve University School of Law Scholarly
Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Health Matrix: The Journal of Law-Medicine by an authorized administrator of Case Western Reserve
University School of Law Scholarly Commons.
Recommended Citation
Edward B. Hirshfeld, Medical Necessity Determinations: The Need for a Legal Structure, 6 Health Matrix 3 (1996)
Available at: https://scholarlycommons.law.case.edu/healthmatrix/vol6/iss1/4
MEDICAL NECESSITY
DETERMINATIONS: THE NEED FOR
A NEW LEGAL STRUCTURE
Edward B. Hirshfeld*
Gail H. Thomason**
I. INTRODUCTION
A CORE PRINCIPLE UNDERLYING THE U.S. legal struc-
ture for health care delivery and finance is being challenged
by a new value. That principle is the supremacy of individual
patient interests in medical decisions. The challenging value is a
societal interest in conserving resources expended on health care.
The societal interest has arisen from efforts by managers of
health plans to reduce health care costs incurred by their benefi-
ciaries. One of the cost reduction techniques used by health
plans is refusal to cover, meaning pay for, medical services
deemed to be unnecessary.
Because of the importance of controlling health care ex-
penditures, our legal system has sought to facilitate the exercise
of the societal interest in cost reduction. However, our system
has also sought to maintain the supremacy of the patient interest
in medical decisions. This has been accomplished by treating
medical decisions for patients and health plan coverage decisions
for plan beneficiaries as independent activities. Coverage deci-
sions are considered to be transactions between the patient and
the health plan, and medical decisions are viewed as transactions
between the physician and the patient. The two transactions are
considered independent because the coverage decision is not sup-
posed to affect the physician's judgment in medical decisions
* Edward Hirshfeld is the Director of the Health Law Division of the Office of Gen-
eral Counsel of the American Medical Association.
** Division Counsel, Managed Care Quality, of the Office of Quality and Managed
Care of the American Medical Association. The authors thank Lorri Zippener, Director of the
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about what is best for the patient, and a refusal to cover treat-
ment recommended by a physician does not bar the patient from
obtaining the services with the patient's own funds.
In many respects, coverage decisions and medical decision
making are in fact independent efforts. The range of medical ser-
vices covered by a health plan is a contractual issue determined
by negotiations between the plan managers and the beneficiaries.
Disputes between the plan managers and a beneficiary over the
extent of coverage are resolved by contract law or, in many but
not all states, by the common law or statutory tort of bad faith
insurance settlement.' The obligation of a physician to provide
the medical care that is best suited to the needs of an individual
patient is a duty inherent in the physician/patient relationship.
Disputes about whether the physician provided appropriate care
are resolved by the tort law of malpractice.
However, there is an area where coverage decisions and
medical decisions merge. When a health plan agrees to cover
health care services, the contract with the beneficiary generally
specifies that the services must be paid for when they are reason-
able and necessary for the diagnosis or treatment of an illness or
injury suffered by the beneficiary. In the event of a dispute be-
tween the health plan and the beneficiary about whether covered
services should be paid for, a determination about whether the
services were reasonable and necessary must be made. This de-
termination, while a coverage decision, is also a medical
decision.
As a practical matter, the medical decision made as a part
of a coverage decision is not independent from the medical deci-
sions made by the physician and patient. Because medical care
can be very expensive, many patients cannot afford to purchase
care that a physician recommends but the health plan will not
cover and therefore, they have to accept the medical decision of
the health plan. The coverage decision becomes the treatment de-
cision. Accordingly, health plans use a variety of techniques to
influence or control medical decisions made by physicians.
1. A health plan is a contract that entitles the beneficiary to payment for liabilities that
are covered risks under the policy. See generally 43 AM. JuR. 2d Insurance §§ 187-218
(1982). In about half of the states, the breach of contract remedy that is inherent in contrac-
tual relations is supplemented by a common law or statutory tort of bad faith insurance settle-
ments 4 BERTRAm HARNErr & IRVING L LEsNicy, THE LAw OF LFE AND HEATH INsURANcE
1401 (1995).
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Determinations about whether medical services are neces-
sary for a patient are often not clear-cut. Medical science is not
precise enough to determine exactly what services are reasonable
and necessary for the diagnosis or treatment of an illness or in-
jury for every given patient. Given the core principle of
supremacy of the individual patient interest, physicians tradition-
ally have been biased towards providing services that might help
a patient, especially if the risk of iatrogenic injury has been
small or nonexistent. Health plans are now seeking to change the
bias towards providing services to a bias towards withholding
services unless there is a strong showing of necessity.
This Article argues that treating coverage decisions and
medical decisions as independent transactions ignores these reali-
ties, and therefore, fails to place appropriate restraints on the
trend towards requiring more rigorous showings of necessity.
This lack of restraint may cause harm to individual patients who
are denied coverage for medical care, and could lead to an over-
all lower level of quality of care than we as a society may be
comfortable with. To prevent this, it is necessary for the law to
recognize the true role that health plans play in medical decision-
making, and to develop mechanisms to appropriately balance the
societal interest in conserving resources with the individual pa-
tient interest.
H. THE TRADITIONAL MEDICO-LEGAL SYSTEM FOR
HEALTH CARE DELIVERY AND FINANCE - A PATIENT-
CENTERED SYSTEM
Under the traditional health care delivery system, health
care providers were expected to act in the best interests of the
patient, delivering whatever care would be most beneficial to the
patient. Insurers paid for such care without question. Three inter-
related structures supported this system: (1) professional self-
regulation, including ethics and quality assurance, where the
guiding principle was supremacy of the patient interest; (2) the
not-for-profit orientation of the majority of medical institutions,
which was meant to keep patient interests paramount by elimi-
nating profit as a motive; (3) legal doctrines which tended to
adopt physician ethics and make the interests of the patient para-
mount; and (4) health plans that deferred to physician recom-
mendations about what medical care was necessary for patients.
Pl
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Patient-centered professional ethics, legal doctrines, and not-
for-profit medical institutions developed together with health
plans, but widespread use of health plans did not take place until
after World War II and modem managed care health plans did
not become widely used until recent years.2 Until that time, the
patient and physician controlled medical decisions. The malprac-
tice laws and laws governing the physician-patient relationship
gave the physician a duty to keep the interests of the patient par-
amount. Other laws, such as the bar on the corporate practice of
medicine, were designed to protect the independence of the phy-
sician's judgment. For a century, health plans operated within the
context of these principles, and did not attempt to interfere with
them.3
2. The first insurance policy for medical expenses to treat bodily injuries that did not
result in death was written in 1850 by the Accidental Death Association of London, and later
that year by the Franklin Health Assurance Company in the United States. By 1860, the Trav-
elers Insurance Company of Hartford was writing policies similar in nature to modem indem-
nity plans, and 60 other companies joined by 1866. The first employee health benefits may
have been a program by Montgomery Ward and Company to provide weekly benefits for sick
or injured employees. HEALT INs. AsS'N OF AmERICA. SOURCE BOOK OF HEALTH INSURANCE
DATA 1994 1 (1995).
The modem prepaid health plan dates back to the late 1920s. In 1929, school teachers in
Dallas, Texas contracted with Baylor Hospital to provide services at a monthly rate. This ar-
rangement is generally acknowledged to have evolved into the Blue Cross and Blue Shield
plans. Id. at 2. Health maintenance organizations date back to 1927, when a prepaid plan
started as a cooperative in Elk City, Oklahoma. Additional plans evolved around major con-
struction sites. However, as of 1972, fewer than 40 health maintenance organizations were in
existence. The trigger for their growth was the Health Maintenance Act of 1973, Pub. L. No.
93-222, Dec. 29, 1973, most of which is codified at 42 U.S.C. 300e, et seq. By 1992, the
number of HMOs had grown to 610. Tom James, Ell & David B. Nash, Health Maintenance
Organizations: A New Development or the Employer's Old Clothes?, in FUmE PRAcncE AL-
TERNATrvEs IN MEnlciNE 203, 208 (David B. Nash ed., 2d ed. 1993) (noting that while health
insurance has existed for over a century, it is generally believed that it did not become
widely used until after World War I. See, e.g., MicnAm. G. MACDONALD E AL., HEALTH
CARE LAw: A PRACrICAL GunaE § 6.04[21 (1985); Susan M. Browning, Forces for Reforming
the U.S. Health Care System: A Review of the Cost and Access Issues, HEALTH ECON., Oct.
1992, at 174. The events which sparked its growth are believed to be favorable tax treatment,
substitution for wage increases during World War 11, and incorporation into labor manage-
ment bargaining just after World War 1n. During the 1970s and 1980s, self-insurance became
the dominant kind of health plan used by employers, and managed care became prevalent.
HEALTH INS. Ass'N OF AmERICA.
3. In fact, many of the first health plans were Blue Cross and Blue Shield plans devel-
oped by hospital associations and medical societies and were controlled by leaders in organ-
ized medicine. Clark C. Havighurst, Are the Antitrust Agencies Overregulating Physician Net-
works? Address at Symposium, Consumerism & Competition: Striking A Balance, Loyola
University of Chicago, School of Law 304 (Oct. 12, 1995). Therefore it was natural for these
health plans to defer to physicians and hospitals in medical decisions.
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A. Origins of the Legal Structure - Physician Ethics
Laws designed to keep patient interests sacrosanct evolved
out of physician ethical codes, which stretch back for thousands
of years. Eight of the 282 Sections of the Babylonian Code of
Hammurabi, the first recorded set of laws dating back to 2000
B.C., refer to medical practice.4 Subsequently, Greeks developed
the Hippocratic Oath, which sets forth a statement of ethical ide-
als to be upheld by medical practitioners.- The Oath was incor-
porated into a code of medical ethics published early in the
eighteenth century by Thomas Percival, a physician and philoso-
pher in England.6 This code served as the foundation for the
code of medical ethics developed by the American Medical As-
sociation shortly after its formation in 1847.
When the AMA was formed, medicine was not a well-re-
garded or well-paid profession. Allopathic physicians competed
with all sorts of practitioners who were not competent. Some of
these incompetent practitioners applied healing techniques that
were not based on the scientific method, others were poorly edu-
cated, and still others were frauds. In addition, the quality of al-
lopathic physicians was uneven. Competition among all of these
healers was fierce. 7 The AMA was established to distinguish al-
4. Bernard D. Hirsh, Medical Ethics, Law and Economics in HISTORY OF THE JUDICIAL
CoutciL 1 (1985) (on file with the American Medical Association).
5. Portions of the Oath of Hippocrates, which emphasizes the obligation of the physi-
cian to put the patient's interest first, are as follows:
I swear by Apollo, the Physician, by Aesculapius, by Hygeia, by Panacea, and by all
the gods and goddesses, making them my witnesses, that I will carry out according
to my ability and judgment, this oath and this indenture .... I will use treatment to
help the sick according to my ability and judgment, but never with a view to injury
and wrongdoing. Neither will I administer a poison to anyone when asked to do so,
nor will I suggest such a course. Similarly I will not give to a woman a pessary to
cause abortion. But I will keep pure and holy both my life and my art. I will not use
the knife, not even, verily, on sufferers from stone, but I will give place to such as
are craftsmen therein. Into whatsoever houses I enter, I will enter to help the sick,
and I will abstain from all intentional wrongdoing and harm, especially from abusing
the bodies of man or woman, bond or free. And whatsoever I shall see or hear in
the course of my profession, as well as outside my profession in my intercourse
with men, if it be what should not be published abroad, I will never divulge, holding
such things to be holy secrets. Now if I carry out this oath, and break it not, may I
gain forever reputation among all men for my life and for my art; but if I transgress
it and forswear myself, may the opposite befall me.
George Merikas, Hippocrates: Still a Contemporary, 8 HuMANE MED. 212, 213 (1992).
6. PicrcvAL's MEDICAL ETmIcs (Chauncey D. Leake ed., 1927).
7. Jeffrey F. Chase-Lubitz, Note, The Corporate Practice of Medicine Doctrine: An
Anachronism in the Modern Health Care Industry, 40 VAND. L REv. 445, 448 (1987) (dis-
cussing the historical development of the dominance of allopathic physicians in American
W'mter 19961
HEALTH MATRIX
lopathic physicians from other healers and gain the confidence of
patients. The goal was to implement programs designed to assure
patients that physicians were competent and could be trusted to
put the interests of patients first.8
The initial program for differentiation was establishment of
an ethical code in 1847 that held physicians to a high standard
of conduct in the care of patients.9 Successful lobbying for li-
censing laws followed during the latter part of the nineteenth
century to assure a minimum level of competence among allo-
paths.10 At the turn of the century, a system for accrediting medi-
cal education was established to weed out poor quality medical
schools." These programs successfully established high standards
of conduct and quality, and enabled allopathic medicine to be-
come the dominant form of medical practice.12 The code and the
other programs formed the basis for society's expectations of
physicians.
One of these expectations was the supremacy of the individ-
ual patient interest in medical decisions. The AMA's Code of
Medical Ethics, revised a number of times over the past 150
years, states that "[a] physician has a duty to do all that he or
she can for the benefit of the individual patient" and
"[p]hysicians have a responsibility to participate and to contrib-
ute their professional expertise in order to safeguard the interests
of patients in decisions made at the societal level regarding the
allocation or rationing of health resources.' 1 3 Ultimately this
medical practice).
8. MoRRis FISHBEIN. A HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN MEDICAL AssocIAToN 1847 TO
1947, at 19-26 (1947).
9. AMERICAN MED. Ass'N. CODE OF MEnIcAL Erincs 91-106 (1847).
10. FISHBEIN, supra note 8, at 1012.
11. Chase-Lubitz, supra note 7, at 454.
12. PAUL STARR. THE SociL TRANSFORMATION OF AMERIcAN MEDICINE 126-27 (1982).
13. CouNcIL ON ETHicAL AND JuDIctL AwAms, AMERICAN MED. Ass'N, CODE oF ME)-
ICAL ETHICs Op. 4-5 (1994). The Principles of Medical Ethics of the American Medical Asso-
ciation show the depth of the committment to the patient interest, and say:
Preamble: The medical profession has long subscribed to a body of ethical state-
ments developed primarily for the benefit of the patient. As a member of this pro-
fession, a physician must recognize responsibility not only to patients, but also to
society, to other health professionals, and to self. The following Principles adopted
by the American Medical Association are not laws, but standards of conduct which
define the essentials of honorable behavior for the physician.
L A physician shall be dedicated to providing competent medical service with com-
passion and respect for human dignity.
I. A physician shall deal honestly with patients and colleagues, and strive to expose
those physicians deficient in character or competence, or who engage in fraud or
[Vol. 6:3
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principle was given judicial and legislative recognition in the
traditional legal structure for health care delivery and finance.
B. Evolution of the Tort of Malpractice
Over time, courts implied the existence of a contract be-
tween physician and patient.14 The contract is triggered by the
establishment of the physician-patient relationship.' 5 The ele-
ments of this contract are based on physician ethics, as physi-
cians held themselves out to the public as professionals who
would behave according to the code. One of the elements of this
contract is a fiduciary duty that runs from the physician to the
patient.' 6 The origin of this duty is the ethical obligation of the
physician to make concern for the patient the physician's first
consideration, and the obligation of the physician to do all that is
possible to benefit the patient.
Malpractice originated as a contract remedy based on the
implicit contract inherent in the physician-patient relationship.
Failure to exercise the care and skill expected of a physician was
considered a breach of the implicit contract and entitled the pa-
tient to collect damages. 17 Ultimately, this contract remedy devel-
oped into the malpractice tort.' 8 This tort is the foundation for
the principle that the patient's interest is supreme.
According to Prosser's treatise on the Law of Torts, the
physician is expected to place the interests of the patient above
deception.
i. A physician shall respect the law and also recognize a responsibility to seek
changes in those requirements which are contrary to the best interests of the patient.
IV. A physician shall respect the rights of patients, of colleagues, and of other health
professionals, and shall safeguard patient confidences within the constraints of the
law.
V. A physician shall continue to study, apply and advance scientific knowledge,
make relevant information available to patients, colleagues, and the public, obtain
consultation, and use the talents of other health professionals when indicated.
VI. A physician shall, in the provision of appropriate patient care, except in emer-
gencies, be free to choose whom to serve, with whom to associate, and the environ-
ment in which to provide medical services.
VII. A physician shall recognize a responsibility to participate in activities contribut-
ing to an improved community.
Id. at xiv.
14. JOSEPH . TARASKA. LEGAL GUIDE FOR PHYSICIANS § 2.01 (1994).
15. Id.
16. 61 AM. JuRL 2d Physicians, Surgeons, and Other Healers §§ 166-173 (1981).
17. W. PAGE KEMON Er AL, PROSSER AND KEEToN ON nE LAw OF TORTS § 32, at 186-
90 (5th ed. 1984) (discussing the liability of physicians).
18. Id.
WVmter 1996]
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all other considerations. 19 The standard of care in malpractice lit-
igation enables the court to assure that physicians abide by that
principle. It allows the court to second guess the value judg-
ments made by physicians when treating patients, and to impose
the court's own value judgments on the profession if appropriate.
This power of the court is especially germane to determinations
about the necessity of medical care for a given patient, therefore
the Article digresses here to give a short explanation of how this
works.20
The standard must be proven in each case, following the
broad guideline that the physician apply the care and skill com-
monly possessed by a member of the profession in good stand-
ing.21 Each side introduces competing evidence regarding the
standard, and the court decides. In a case where the issue is
whether the physician failed to provide all necessary care, there
are two dimensions to the standard: (a) determining what medi-
cal care would have benefitted the patient, and (b) making a
value judgment about whether the benefits would have been sig-
nificant enough to provide in light of all other considerations.
Determining the benefits of medical care is handled by physi-
cians - no one else has the knowledge to do so. The value
judgment is made by the court.
This was illustrated in Helling v. Carey,22 a case in which a
twenty-nine-year-old patient was not tested for glaucoma, but
subsequently was found to have the disease and was harmed due
to the late diagnosis. The national standard among physicians at
the time was not to test for glaucoma in twenty-nine-year-old pa-
tients because of the low incidence of the disease in that age
group. The court found that the national standard was wrong,
and that the patient should have been tested. It made a value
judgment in reaching this decision that the consequences to the
individual patient of failure to detect the disease were so grave
that even young patients should be tested. This case clearly illus-
trates the ultimate power of the court to make the value judg-
ment about what constitutes necessary care.
19. Id.
20. Edward B. Hirshfeld, Should Ethical and Legal Standards for Physicians Be
Changed to Accommodate New Models for Rationing Health Care? 140 U. PA. L. REv. 1809,
1829 (1992)
21. KEMoN, supra note 17, at 187.
22. 519 P.2d 981 (Wash. 1974).
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C. The Bar on the Corporate Practice of Medicine
Malpractice laws were not considered sufficient to assure
the supremacy of the patient interest. Other laws meant to pre-
vent the physician's judgment from being influenced were also
developed. One of these was the bar on the corporate practice of
medicine.
As mentioned above, by the end of the nineteenth century,
physicians had successfully lobbied for statutes requiring that
physicians be licensed in order to practice medicine.23 Most
states required that physicians graduate from a recognized medi-
cal school and pass a licensing exam in order to be licensed.24
At the same time, certain industries, including railroads,
lumbering, and mining, were hiring physicians to treat employee
populations. This practice was opposed by leaders of organized
medicine, as they feared that working directly for corporations
would influence physicians' treatment methods, diagnoses, in-
comes, and relationships with patients.2 Arguments were made
that corporate employment of physicians meant that the corpora-
tions were actually practicing medicine; since state licensing stat-
utes required licensure of an individual, not a corporation, such
employment should be barred.
The courts adopted the position of organized medicine and
banned the corporate practice of medicine as violative of state li-
censing statutes. Much of the rationale for the bar was based on
the different fiduciary duties of the corporation and the physi-
cian. Courts pointed out that the fiduciary duty of the directors,
officers, and managers of the corporation runs to the sharehold-
ers, whereas the duty of the physician is to the patient. The cor-
poration, therefore, had a conflict of interest when it attempted to
practice medicine while physicians did not.26 Therefore, corpora-
23. FtsrmEm, supra note 8 and accompanying text.
24. Chase-Lubitz, supra note 7, at 451.
25. Id. at 456-57.
26. See Berlin v. Sarah Bush Lincoln Health Ctr., No. 95-MR-7, slip op. at 7-8 (5th
Cir. hi. June 15, 1995) affid 664 N.E. 2d 337 (Ill. 1996) (stating that to permit a corporate
entity not organized under the Medical Practice Act to enforce a contract against a licensed
physician would be contrary to Illinois legislation); see also Dr. Allison, Dentist, Inc. v. Al-
lison, in which the Illinois Supreme Court stated-
To practice a profession requires something more than the financial ability to hire
competent persons to do the actual work. It can be done only by a duly qualified
human being, and to qualify something more than mere knowledge or skill is essen-
tial. The qualifications include personal characteristics, such as honesty, guided by
an upright conscience and a sense of loyalty to clients or patients, even to the extent
Wimrl 96]
HEALTH MATRIX
tions were prohibited from practicing medicine through licensed
employees or from realizing profits from a physician's profes-
sional ministrations. 27
Eventually statutes passed in virtually every state allowed
physicians to form professional service corporations to gain the
benefits of limited liability afforded by the corporate form of
business organization. 28 However, this limited liability was found
by the courts not to extend to malpractice liability.29 The ratio-
nale is that physicians have a special and confidential relation-
ship with their patients, the consequences for negligent or wrong-
ful acts by physicians towards their patients can be very serious,
therefore physicians should be held to high standards of conduct
and made vulnerable to personal liability.30 In other words, the
courts felt that it was so important that physicians put the inter-
ests of the patient first that they should not be personally
shielded by the corporate form.
D. Development of the Autonomous Hospital Medical Staff -
Hospital Licensing Laws and Deeming of JCAHO Accreditation
While the medical profession was developing, hospitals
were evolving as well. Hospitals developed a corporate legal
structure that had the potential to remove the ultimate power
over medical decision making of patients staying in the hospital.
The same concerns that were raised about other corporations
were raised about hospital control over physicians. These con-
cerns were resolved by requiring hospitals to have a separate, or-
ganized medical staff responsible for the medical management of
patients in the hospital.31
of sacrificing pecuniary profit, if necessary.
These requirements are spoken of generically as that good moral character which is a pre-
requisite to the licensing of any professional man. No corporation can qualify. It can have
neither honesty nor conscience, and its loyalty must, in the very nature of its being, be
yielded to its managing offices, its directors and its stockholders. Its employees must owe
their first allegiance to their corporate employer and cannot give the patient anything better
than secondary or divided loyalty. 196 N.E. 799, 800 (Il. 1935).
27. See generally Catherine I. Hansen, Corporate Practice of Medicine Issues in an In-
tegrated Delivery System, (Nov. 1994) (unpublished manuscript, Nat'l Health Lawyers Ass'n)
(summarizing state positions on barring the corporate practice of medicine).
28. 18 AM. JUI. 2d Corporations § 37 (1985) (explaining the rationales allowing pro-
fessional service corporations).
29. 18A A. JutR. 2d Corporations § 854.
30. Id.
31. This requirement, established in 1919 by the founders of the hospital accreditation
[Vol. 6:3
MEDICAL NECESSITY DETERMINATIONS
The hospital medical staff controls the review and creden-
tialing of each physician by his or her peers. Review of physi-
cian behavior and satisfaction of professional standards, there-
fore, is made by the physician's peers, not by lay persons,
including judicial lay persons. So long as physicians follow the
medical staff bylaws, including any procedural requirements,
courts will not second-guess the professional analysis performed
by physicians upon their peers. 32
Physician self-governance is based on the belief that
"[P]hysicians' fiduciary responsibility extends to ensuring that
other professionals or organizations to which the physician refers
patients are worthy of their trust. This includes responsibility for
the quality of the care in hospitals or other institutions to which
their patients are admitted. '33
E. The Bar on Fee Splitting
The bar on fee splitting is designed to protect the physi-
cian's judgment from corrupting influences. It is based on an eth-
ical rule that fee splitting violates public policy because the pub-
lic is best served by recommendations uninfluenced by financial
considerations. 34 The danger inherent in fee splitting is that it
may motivate individuals to recommend the services of a profes-
sional out of self-interest, rather than out of the competence of
the physician.35 Accordingly, statutes have been adopted that pro-
hibit dividing any fee or commission received from provision of
professional services by a physician with anyone other than phy-
sicians with whom the individual practices.3 6 This means physi-
program, is currently a part of the standards for hospital accreditation of the Joint Commis-
sion on Accreditation of Healthcare Organizations and of the statutory or regulatory condi-
tions of hospital licensure in virtually every state. See generally Everett A. Johnson, Ethical
Considerations for Business Relationships of Hospitals and Physicians, HEALTH CARE Mory.
REv. Summer 1991, at 7, 9 (discussing the effect of the growth of business-based ventures
between hospitals and physicians on the traditional ethical standards expected of physicians).
32. See Rao v. St. Elizabeth's Hosp., 488 N.E.2d 685 (Il. App. Ct. 1986) (upholding
right of hospital to use peer review rather than judicial review).
33. INsr. oF Mn. NAT'L AcA r. oF Sc., FoR-PRorrr ENTramaisE IN HaLH CARE 182
(1986).
34. See O'Hara v. Ahlgren, Blumenfeld & Kempster, 537 N.E.2d 730 (I1l. 1989) (hold-
ing that fee sharing arrangement between attorneys and non-attorneys is against public
policy).
35. See E & B Mktg. Enters., Inc. v. Ryan, 568 N.E.2d 339, 342 (111. App. Ct. 1991);
Morelli v. Ehsan, 756 P.2d 129 (Wash. 1988).
36. See, e.g., ILL ANN. STAT. ch. 225, 60/22(A)(14) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1995).
W'mter 1996]
HEALTH MATRIX
cians may not share, pool, or divide fees unless the arrangement
falls within a specific enumerated exception, such as shared prac-
tice or concurrently rendering patient care (when the patient has
full knowledge of the fee division).
F Fraud and Abuse in Medicare and Medicaid
Bars on fraud and abuse are also meant to prevent the phy-
sician from being corrupted by financial considerations. They are
intended to discourage over-treatment or inappropriate care and
to safeguard the physician-patient relationship. 37 The federal
fraud and abuse statute applies only to the Medicare and Medi-
caid programs;38 nevertheless, it is quite broad. A violator is any-
one who "knowingly and willfully solicits or receives any remu-
neration (including any kickback, bribe, or rebate) directly or
indirectly, overtly or covertly, in cash or in kind ... in return
for referring an individual to a person for the furnishing or ar-
ranging for the furnishing of any item or service. ' ' 39 If even one
purpose of a payment can be inferred to be the inducement of
referrals, then a violation of the law has occurred.4°
1. Statutes Barring Self-Referral
To further protect the public from cost overruns and over-
treatment, Congress in 1989 passed a bill prohibiting physicians
from referring Medicare patients needing tests to clinical labs in
which the physicians had a financial interest.4' This law was ex-
panded in 1993 to cover Medicaid patients and to cover ten addi-
tional service categories, including physical therapy services, ra-
diology services, durable medical equipment, prosthetics, home
health services, outpatient prescription drugs, and the like.42
Known as Stark I and Stark II, the laws subject violators to fines
37. See 141 Cong. Rec. E1595 (daily ed. Aug. 2, 1995) (statement of Rep. Stark) (in-
troducing legislation to eliminate physician self-referral).
38. 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7b (1994). Penalties for violation are both civil - fines of up
to $25,000 - and criminal - up to five years of imprisonment - in nature and can include
suspension of a provider from the Medicare and Medicaid programs.
39. 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7b(b)(1)(a) (1994).
40. United States v. Greber, 760 E2d 68 (3d Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 988
(1985) (holding that payments made to induce future referrals violate Medicare statutes).
41. 42 U.S.C. § 1395nn (1994).
42. Id. § 1395nn(h)(6).
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of up to $15,000 per prohibited referral. In addition, some states
have also enacted self-referral bans.
2. Economic Structures
The traditional indemnity health insurance system developed
in the context of the law and ethics described above. Under that
system, patients had the freedom to choose any physician or
other provider. Any physician or provider could participate and
receive payment from the insurer. The insurance company, or
payor, had an obligation to pay for all health care that was rea-
sonable and necessary for the diagnosis or treatment of an illness
or injury. Except in unusual circumstances, judgment of the treat-
ing physician was the accepted standard for establishing that a
treatment was medically necessary; no utilization review existed.
Payors did not have an obligation to furnish care or to assure the
quality of care.43 Non-profit institutions such as Blue Cross and
Blue Shield adopted and supported this system,44 and this struc-
ture was also adopted by the Medicare and Medicaid programs. 45
III. THE EMERGENCE OF THE SOCIETAL INTEREST
AND THE CONFLICT WITH THE PATIENT INTEREST
The traditional medico-legal structure worked well for de-
cades. However, advances in medical technology have made
health care substantially more expensive 46 relative to when our
traditional medico-legal structure was first developed.47 Today, fi-
43. A model group health indemnity insurance plan and discussion about the provisions
thereof may be found in 2 HAmErr & LEsNICK, supra note 1, at 6A-1. A review of this
model and the annotations shows that the only obligation of the plan is to pay for covered
care incurred by the beneficiaries.
44. See ROBERT D. FtLmas. REGULATION OF BLUE CRoss AND BLUE SHIELD PLANS 10-28
(1963) (tracing the development of Blue Cross and Blue Shield's medical care coverage from
1929 to 1962).
45. The "traditional" Medicare program operates much like a traditional indemnity in-
surance health plan. It allows patients free choice of providers anywhere in the United States,
physicians are paid on a fee-for-service basis, and there are few prospective utilization con-
trols. See MAcDONALD ET AL, supra note 2, § 7.03, at 7-23.
46. There is growing recognition that advances in technology are a primary reason for
the rapid increase in health care expenditures. William B. Schwartz, The Inevitable Failure of
Current Cost-Containment Strategies: Why They Can Provide Only Temporary Relief, 257
JAMA 220, 222 (1987). See also Richard A. Rettig, Medical Innovation Duels Cost Contain-
ment, HEALTH AFF., Summer 1994, at 7, 8-9; Alan M. Garber, Can Technology Assessment
Control Health Spending?, HEALTH AsF., Summer 1994, at 115, 117.
47. At one time, most Americans could afford treatment for even serious illnesses or
injuries, simply because there were so few adequate solutions for health care problems. Be-
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nancing the treatment of a serious illness or injury from one's
own resources has become difficult or impossible for most
Americans.48
Over the past fifty years, most Americans became reliant on
health plans to finance their health care. Health plans solve the
affordability problem by enabling individual Americans to fi-
nance the treatment of serious illnesses or injuries.49 However,
this solution causes health plan participants to become interde-
pendent. A conflict emerges between the interests of an individ-
ual plan participant and the interests of the participants as a
group, for as the amount spent by the health plan on the care of
one participant increases, the amount left to pay for the care of
other participants decreases.- °
One way of resolving this conflict is to fund the coverage
pool with enough money to pay for all the care that is needed.
However, conflicts then emerge over uses for money. As the
amount of money needed from a participant to fund the pool in-
creases, that participant has less money available for other desir-
able or necessary purposes. At some point individual participants
become unwilling or unable to sacrifice expenditures for other
purposes in order to contribute enough money to the pool to pay
for the care that is desired by other participants. A participant
seeking to draw money from the pool then comes into conflict
with other participants who have other uses for the money that
could be paid into the pool.
tween 1930 and 1950, medical care accounted for only 4.1 to 4.4% of consumer expendi-
tures. FRANK G. DICKINSON, AMERICAN MED. ASS'N, MEDICAL CARE ExPENDrruRE, PRICEs
AND QUANTrrY 1930-1950, 7 (1951). In 1993, spending on medical care represented 17.3% of
personal consumption expenditures. BUREAU OF ECONOMIC ANALYSIS, U.S. DEP'T OF COM-
MERCE, SURlvEY OF CURRENT BusINEss 64 (July 1994).
48. It is still possible for most Americans to afford care for simple health care
problems, although many have lost the habit of budgeting for it due to the existence of health
insurance. See CENTER FOR HEALTH POLICY RESEARCH, AMERICAN MED. Ass'N
SocmoEcONOsuC CHARACTERISTICS OF MEDICAL PRACnCE 1995, 96-97 (Martin L. Gonzalez
ed., 1995) (illustrating the average cost for a visit to a physician in the United States).
49. Health plans have also been the source of funds necessary to fuel rapid advances in
technology that, in turn, have caused rapid increases in health care expenditures. Garber,
supra note 46, at 116-17.
50. If it were always possible for the individual to solve a serious conflict with the
group by paying for the health care involved, the existence of this conflict would not be a
great concern. However, when the conflict is greatest, it is the least likely that the individual
can pay. In the context of government health plans, the issue is the provision of care for the
poor, the disabled, and the elderly. Matthew Menken, Caring for the Underserved: Health In-
surance Coverage Is Not Enough, 48 ARCHIVES NEUROLOGY 472, 472 (1991).
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When this conflict is viewed in aggregate, it can be seen as
a conflict between the interests of the individual and the interests
of society. At any given point in time, there is a finite amount of
resources available in society as a whole. Many uses compete for
the available resources.51
This conflict always existed. However, the conflict did not
emerge as a serious issue for many years because the cost of
health care was low enough that it could be absorbed with af-
fordable contributions to the pools. But now health care costs are
increasing faster than the ability or will of Americans to pay for
health plans,52 and health care is accounting for a larger and
larger share of the society's resources.5 3 As a result, health plan
managers are seeking ways to rein in health care expenditures.
The search for cost controls has sharpened the conflict between
the needs of individual patients and the group.
Some methods used by health plan managers to reduce costs
compromise the needs of an individual patient in favor of pre-
serving the pool of funds available to pay for care for the rest of
the beneficiaries. Some of these methods, such as limitations on
the kinds of illnesses or injuries that will be paid for, or limita-
tions on the amount of money that will be paid for the care of a
beneficiary, do not challenge the core values of our legal struc-
ture for health care delivery and finance because they do not
concern medical decision making.54 They are strictly a matter of
51. AMERICAN MED. Ass'N, 1995 PUBLIC OPINION AND HEALTH CARE ISSUES SURVEY
(1995); Robert J. Blendon et al., Bridging the Gap Between Expert and Public Views on
Health Care Reform, 269 JAMA 2573 (1993) (comparing public and expert views on the
problems, causes, and solutions surrounding health care reform).
52. Id.
53. Health care spending accounted for 7.1% of the U.S. Gross National Product in
1969, and 9% in 1979. Mark S. Freeland & Carol Ellen Schendler, National Health Expendi-
tures: Short-Term Outlook and Long-Term Projections, HEALTH CARE FINANCING REv. 97, 112
(Winter 1981). Health care spending is expected to rise to 17.9% of the Gross Domestic
Product by 2005. Sally T. Burner & Daniel R. Waldo, National Health Expenditure Projec-
tions, 1994-2005, HEALTH CARE FINANCING REv. at 221, 221 (Summer 1995).
54. Health plan managers generally try to find ways to reduce costs that preserve the
core value of placing the interests of the individual patient first. Edward B. Hirshfeld, The
Health Care Industry's Transformation and the Antitrust Laws in ANTITUST AND THE EvoLv-
ING HEALTH CARE MARKETs 9-16 (Edward B. Hirshfeld et al. eds., 1995). For example, rather
than cutting back on necessary medical services, managers try to eliminate fraud and en-
courage providers to form networks that operate more efficiently. The drive for efficiency has
resulted in fundamental changes in the way that health care delivery is organized. The indus-
try is rapidly moving from an atomized "cottage industry" format to aggregations of
providers.
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insurance contract about the extent of insurance coverage that an
individual is willing to buy.
Other methods do challenge the core values of our legal
system. One of these is the elimination of unnecessary care. The
object is to prevent expenditures on health care that are not nec-
essary for the diagnosis or treatment of an illness or injury.
However, to eliminate unnecessary care requires that the differ-
ence between necessary and unnecessary be defined. That ulti-
mately involves weighing the interests of the individual against
the interests of the group.
IV. DEFINING THE CONCEPT OF MEDICAL NECESSITY
The concept of controlling costs by eliminating unnecessary
medical care arose from research performed by physicians about
the comparative rates at which the same medical services were
provided to comparable populations in different geographic areas.
These studies revealed that different populations received ser-
vices at different rates, but the overall health of the populations
did not differ. From this empirical evidence it was inferred that
the populations receiving medical services at higher rates were
receiving a certain amount of unnecessary care, meaning services
that did not improve the health of the population.55 It was also
inferred that the volume of unnecessary care was significant.56
This research was borne out by further studies which com-
pared medical records for patients receiving certain kinds of
medical services with a list of symptoms and conditions that in-
dicate when those services should be provided. It was found that
the services were being provided to some patients who did not
display the indicated symptoms and conditions.5 7 From this evi-
55. Lucian L. Leape, Practice Guidelines and Standards: An Overview, 16 QuALrry
REv. BuLL. 42, 42 (1990) (discussing the unnecessary and inappropriate performance of some
health services).
56. Id. at 42-43 (analyzing the use of practice guidelines as a tool to reduce inappropri-
ate care and to help control costs). See generally William L. Roper et al., Effectiveness in
Health Care: An Initiative to Evaluate and Improve Medical Practice, 319 NEw ENG. J. MED.
1197, 1200 (1988) (reviewing patient outcome studies and the line to practice patterns); but
see John T. Kelly & Shirley E. Kellie, Appropriateness of Medical Care: Findings, Strategies,
114 AHcupvs PATHOLOgY & LABORATORY MED. 1119, 1119-20 (1990) (summarizing current
literature concerning inappropriate medical services that questions whether a significant pro-
portion - up to 20% - of medical care is actually unnecessary, even though only 2% of
claims reviewed by Medicare Peer Review Organizations were found unnecessary).
57. Constance M. Winslow et al., The Appropriateness of Performing Coronary Artery
Bypass Surgery, 260 JAMA 505, 507 (1988) (arguing that inappropriate surgeries are some-
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dence it was inferred that significant numbers of patients who
did not display the indicated symptoms were receiving the ser-
vices unnecessarily.58
This research raised the question of why physicians were
providing significant amounts of unnecessary care, and whether
that phenomenon could be corrected. One possible explanation
for the provision of unnecessary care was fraud and self-interest,
as under the traditional health plan, physicians make more
money if they provide services than if they do not. Certainly that
does occur, and the amount of unnecessary care provided due to
fraud or self-interest is significant. But, according to the re-
searchers, that is not the primary reason for the provision of un-
necessary services. They concluded that the primary cause is lack
of knowledge.59
There is lack of knowledge for two reasons. One is that
much of medical science is based on the collective experience of
physicians and has never been subjected to rigorous analysis
with outcomes studies. Such studies attempt to measure the ex-
tent to which a service helps a patient return to normalcy after
an illness or injury. Therefore, the real benefits of many services
are uncertainY' Second, there is a huge base of medical knowl-
edge available in medical literature, and that base of knowledge
is expanding at a prodigious rate. The vehicles for disseminating
that knowledge are poor, and even if better disseminated it
would be impossible for physicians to master all of the data.61
These conclusions led to a movement to develop practice
guidelines for physicians. Practice guidelines are intended to be
statements about the best medical practice for handling a given
illness or injury that are distilled into a form that is easy to dis-
seminate and easy to use. The purpose of the guidelines is to
times done irrespective of the symptoms); Thomas B. Graboys et al., Results of a Second-
Opinion Program for Coronary Artery Bypass Graft Surgery, 258 JAMA 1611, 1614 (1987)
(indicating that without second opinions patients often receive necessary surgery); Mark R.
Chassin et al., Does Inappropriate Use Explain Geographic Variations in the Use of Health
Care Services?, 258 JAMA 2533 (1987) (explaining results of study of inappropriate proce-
dures over several geographical regions).
58. Leape, supra note 55; Roper et al., supra note 56; Kelly & Kellie, supra note 56.
59. Leape, supra note 55, at 43 (concluding that physicians may provide inappropriate
and unnecessary medical care when they base their decisions on inadequate information).
60. Id. (mentioning the numerous factors that are used to assess the benefits of clinical
services).
61. Id. (assessing the difficulty in sorting out useful information from an overwhelming
volume of clinical irrelevancies).
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eliminate unnecessary care and to enhance the quality of care by
improving the medical knowledge that is readily available to
practicing physicians. Guidelines are created by subjecting the
services available to diagnose or treat an illness or injury to rig-
orous analysis. This is done by conducting outcomes studies and/
or evaluating all available medical knowledge about the subject.
This information is then distilled into the guideline.62
Many organizations are attempting to draft practice guide-
lines, including an agency of the federal government. 63 However,
the movement is still in its early stages, and many problems
need to be resolved before practice guidelines will be widely
used to guide the treatment of most medical conditions. One of
the most serious practical problems is the lack of an adequate
base of outcomes studies to determine the benefits of many
health care services.64 These studies are time-consuming and ex-
pensive to conduct, and it may not ever be possible to have all
of the studies that are needed to answer questions about the ben-
efits of medical services.
Another problem is the enormous variability in patients.
Different individuals react differently to illnesses and injuries and
the treatments available to resolve them. It is extremely difficult
62. See Anne-Marie Audet et al., Medical Practice Guidelines: Current Activities and
Future Directions, 113 ANNALS INTERNAL MaD. 709, 709 (1990) (explaining the state of the
art in the field of medical practice guidelines); John T. Kelly & James E. Swartwout, Devel-
opment of Practice Parameters by Physician Organizations, 16 QuALrTY REv. BuLw. 54, 56-
57 (1990) (describing the fundamental principles by which practice parameters should be de-
veloped); Eleanor D. Kinney & Marilyn M. Wilder, Medical Standard Setting in the Current
Malpractice Environment: Problems and Possibilities, 22 U.C. DAVIS L. REv. 421 (1989) (dis-
cussing the development of medical care standards and their use in malpractice cases); Steven
H. Woolf, Practice Guidelines: A New Reality in Medicine, 150 ARcEnvas INTERNAL MED.
1811 (1990) (discussing the development and utilization of practice guidelines).
63. The Agency for Health Care Policy and Research (AHCPR) and a unit of AHCPR
called The Forum for Quality and Effectiveness in Health Care joined forces to pursue the
development of practice guidelines, among other matters. See Omnibus Budget Reconciliation
Act of 1989, Pub. L. No. 101-239 § 6103, 103 Stat. 2106, 2189 (codified at 42 U.S.C.A. §§
299, 299b-1 to -3) (1991 and Supp. 1995). Other organizations that are involved in the devel-
opment of practice guidelines include the AMA Practice Parameters Partnership (comprised
of 14 of the largest medical specialty societies, the AHCPR, the JCAHO, and the AHA) re-
sponsible for coordinating the activities of the medical profession with regard to practice pa-
rameters, and the AMA Practice Parameters Forum (comprised of more than 80 physician or-
ganizations and others), which provides the scientific expertise and broad-based clinical
representation necessary to ensure the development of scientifically sound, clinically relevant
practice parameters.
64. Alice G. Gosfield, Clinical Practice Guidelines and the Law: Applications and Im-
plications, in HEALTH LAW HANDBOOK 65, 86 (1994) (discussing the increased scrutiny on
clinical providers due to health care reform and the implications of the policies instituted due
to the increased scrutiny).
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to account for this variability in developing practice guidelines.
As a result of the lack of outcomes studies, the variability of in-
dividual patients, and other problems, substantial uncertainty
about the benefits of proposed medical care for a given individ-
ual still exists. That raises the question of whether it is possible
to draft practice guidelines with a high degree of precision about
what medical care is necessary.
V. HEALTH PLANS ARE ENGAGED IN MAKING VALUE
JUDGMENTS IN THEIR NECESSITY DETERMINATIONS
Health plans are aware of the research into medical neces-
sity and the practice guidelines movement. The cost problem is
so great that they have applied procedures designed to determine
the necessity of medical care recommended for their benefi-
ciaries. The goal of these determinations is to provide the mini-
mum amount of health care necessary to resolve a health care
problem and to pay for those services, and for only those ser-
vices. If the provision of a medical service will not improve the
outcome, then health plan managers consider that it is not neces-
sary, and should not be covered. 65 However, making necessity
determinations requires that health plans engage in making value
judgments that weigh the needs of the individual against the
needs of the group.
Health plans have tried to define the necessity determina-
tions in a way that avoids value judgments. They have done so
by arguing that the minimum amount of health care necessary to
resolve a health care problem is the optimal amount of health
care that a patient should receive. It is argued that if the provi-
sion of an additional unit of health care does not improve a pa-
tient's outcome, then the provision of that unit of health care ac-
tually harms the patient. Harm allegedly occurs because the
patient is exposed to the risk of iatrogenic injury without any
commensurate improvement in outcome. It is theorized that the
relationship between the provision of additional medical services
and outcome is a curve, whereby the provision of additional
medical services improves the outcome until an optimum point is
reached, after which the provision of still more services ad-
65. Peter R. Kongstvedt, Authorization Systems in THE MANAGED HEALTH CARE HAND-
BOOK 180, 180 (Peter R. Kongstvedt ed., 1993).
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versely affects the outcome. 66
High
Q uality of ................. tim um Point
Outcome
Low
Quantity of Services
Use of this analysis reconciles the needs of the individual
with the needs of the group. It makes efforts by payers to deter-
mine medical necessity a process to find the optimal amount of
health care for a patient and prevent the patient from being
harmed. Instead of being a process where the individual patient
who might be denied care is put at risk, necessity determinations
are defined as a process that protects patients.
However, this way of defining necessity is based upon fic-
tion. Medical science is not nearly precise enough to determine
the optimal point for a given patient in most cases. There simply
is not enough accumulated medical knowledge about either the
benefits or the risks of most medical care to make that determi-
nation. It also does not appear likely that the science of medicine
will advance enough in the foreseeable future to achieve that
kind of precision. For now and the foreseeable future, medical
66. DAVID E. VoG. THE PHYSICIAN AND MANAGED CARE 34-35 (1993) (referring to
the conflicting pressures on the health services delivery system).
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decisions involve a substantial amount of uncertainty about what
will help and what may actually harm a patient. When health
plans make or influence necessity determinations, they are en-
gaged in making value judgments that weigh the interests of the
individual against the group.
VI. THE VALUE JUDGMENTS INHERENT IN NECESSITY
DETERMINATIONS - WEIGHING THE SOCIETAL
INTEREST AGAINST THE PATIENT INTEREST
There are several kinds of value judgments that have to be
made in necessity determinations. Examples are described below.
While some medical services clearly benefit patients by
resolving their health care problems, and others clearly do noth-
ing to resolve the same problems, still others provide a marginal
benefit, meaning that they are of some help but do not cure the
illness or heal the injury. The question arises when the benefit is
too small to be worth the expense of providing it. This kind of
value judgment pits the needs of the individual against the needs
of the group or society.
Some medical services yield dramatic benefits to certain in-
dividuals but none to others, and it may not be possible to know
who will benefit until the services are provided. For example,
mammography is a diagnostic test used to detect breast cancer.
The benefits of early diagnosis are dramatic - survival rates in-
crease significantly. However, it is not possible to know who
will benefit from the test before it is given since its purpose is
detection. It is possible to identify women more at risk for can-
cer than others, but even some women without the risk indicators
get the disease. The value judgment is whether it is worth the
expense of providing mammography to low-risk women.67 Decid-
ing on a threshold is a value judgment that pits the needs of the
individual against the needs of the group.
Still other medical services have a risk of serious iatrogenic
injury to a small number of individuals. More expensive alterna-
tive services eliminate the risk, but it is impossible to know who
is at risk in advance. An example is the use of contrast agents
for radiographic tests. One kind of contrast agent is low-cost, but
67. See generally Karen K. Lindfors & C. John Rosenquist, The Cost-Effectiveness of
Mammographic Screening Strategies, 274 JAMA 881 (1995) (comparing and analyzing the
cost-effectiveness of different mammographic strategies).
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a small number of patients have an allergic reaction to it that can
cause death. It is not possible to know who they are in advance.
An alternative kind of agent does not produce allergic reactions,
but is substantially more expensive than the low-cost agent. The
value judgment is whether it is worth the expense of using the
high-cost agent for all patients to avoid risk to a small number
of patients.6s
Since the extent of the benefits of providing medical care
are often uncertain, physicians prefer to build a safety margin
into their recommendations. When diagnosing a patient, physi-
cians like to have as much information as possible, and there-
fore, they conduct diagnostic tests. When a patient has been hos-
pitalized due to an illness, injury, or to receive a medical
procedure, physicians like to have the patient in the hospital dur-
ing the most difficult phases of recovery. Complications are
likely to be noticed sooner and help is close by in the event of
an emergency. Providing services increases the safety margin for
the patient.
As safety margins are narrowed, it is likely that most of the
patients in a health plan will not be harmed as a result, but the
risk that one or more individual patients will be harmed in-
creases. Reducing the margin of safety makes more money avail-
able for care needed by the group as a whole, but it places indi-
vidual members of the group at risk. The value judgment that
needs to be made is how much of a risk is acceptable, knowing
that some individuals are going to be harmed as the degree of
risk increases.
Ultimately, medical necessity can be thought of as a contin-
uum, whereby services at one end of the continuum are clearly
necessary for the diagnosis and treatment of an illness or injury,
and services at the other end of the continuum are clearly unnec-
essary, but in between are services that have some degree of
likelihood of benefiting a patient.69 As one moves along the con-
tinuum from clearly necessary to clearly unnecessary, the per-
centage of likelihood of a benefit from the provision of the
health care involved decreases. The value judgment that must be
68. Radiographic Contrast Media, PRoc. OF HousE oF DELEGATEs (American Med.
Ass'n, Orlando, Fla.), Dec. 2-5, 1990, at 316.
69. Frederick Federico, The Lakeside Organization: A Physician Organization in a
Heavily Managed Care Market, Address at the Michigan State Medical Society Symposium,
Physician Organizations: Putting Doctors in the Driver's Seat (Sept. 16, 1995).
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made is how large the percentage of likelihood of a benefit
should be for care to be provided.70 The closer that percentage is
to 100%, the more likely it is that some individuals will be
harmed by the withholding of care that could have benefited
them.
While value judgments have to be made to apply the con-
cept of necessity in medical decision making, our society still
does not have any express standards for doing so. For example,
there is no commonly agreed upon percentage at which the like-
lihood of patient benefit makes providing medical care
worthwhile.
Under the traditional medico-legal structure, the patient, in
consultation with a physician, decided how high the percentage
of benefit should be before receiving care. That enabled the pro-
cess of making the value judgment and the result of the value
judgment to be highly patient-centered. The lack of standards for
use in making the value judgment was not perceived as a serious
problem because each patient was able to make the value judg-
ment about the patient's care.
Now that power is being taken away from patients and is
being determined by health plan managers acting on behalf of
the insured group. The societal interest is being incorporated into
the value judgment. Health plans are proceeding along an unde-
fined path in applying concepts of necessity to medical decision
making. Each plan has substantial latitude for how it defines ne-
cessity, and different plans proceed in varying ways.
VII. TECHNIQUES USED BY HEALTH PLANS TO INJECT
THE SOCIETAL INTEREST INTO NECESSITY
DETERMINATIONS
Numerous techniques are used by health plans to eliminate
unnecessary care. These are effective at injecting the societal in-
terest into necessity determinations.
The techniques can be divided into two major categories.
One category enables the health plan actually to make medical
decisions for individual patients or to directly influence such
medical decisions. These techniques can put the physician and
patient at odds with the health plan, as the health plan may re-
70. Hirshfeld, supra note 20, at 1828-31 (discussing the difficulty of establishing a
standard of care when the benefits derived vary from case to case).
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fuse to pay for medical treatment that a physician recommends
for the patient and the patient may want. The result of the appli-
cation of these techniques can be a clear confrontation between
the patient interest and the societal interest, where the physician
represents and advocates the patient interest and the health plan
represents and advocates the societal interest. The conflict is visi-
ble to the patient and to society as a whole.
Other techniques indirectly influence medical decision mak-
ing. They enlist the physician to adopt the societal interest in
medical decisions. The physician is given incentives to practice
in a way that minimizes the use of medical resources. These in-
centives align the interest of the physician with the interest of
the health plan in guarding the societal interest. This can cause
both the health plan and the physician to be at odds with the in-
terests of the individual patient. It also minimizes open conflict
between the patient interest and the societal interest, primarily
because it makes the incorporation of the societal interest into
medical decision making less visible to the patient.
Indirect techniques are generally belL- ed to be more effec-
tive than direct techniques, because indirect techniques enlist the
physician on the side of the societal interest. Therefore, use of
indirect techniques is growing and they are expected to
predominate in the near future. Examples of both types of tech-
niques are described below.
A. Direct Influences Over Medical Decision Making
Techniques that directly involve health plans in medical de-
cision making include prospective and concurrent utilization re-
view, case management, and the required use of practice
guidelines.
Utilization review requires patients and physicians to obtain
authorization from the health plan prior to the provision of medi-
cal services. If authorization is not obtained, the services will not
be covered. These techniques are generally used for expensive
services such as hospitalization. They give the health plan an op-
portunity to review and override the recommendation of the phy-
sician if the health plan disagrees with its necessity.7' Application
71. Peter R. Kongstvedt, Controlling ReferrallConsultant Utilization in THE MANAGED
HEALTH CARE HANDBOOK 116, 119 (Peter R. Kongstvedt ed., 2d ed. 1993). For a discussion
of prospective, concurrent, and retrospective review, see Peter R. Kongstvedt, Controlling
[Vol. 6:3
MEDICAL NECESSITY DETERMINATIONS
of these techniques is very visible to the patient. The physician
can remain patient-centered and advocate for the patient before
the health plan.
Case management involves the assignment of an agent of
the health plan to direct the provision of care to health plan ben-
eficiaries with serious illnesses. The manager may direct that cer-
tain providers be used who apply an agreed upon course of treat-
ment.72 Like the utilization review techniques, case management
directly involves the health plan in decision making for individ-
ual patients, and is visible to the patient.
Required use of practice guidelines involves mandating that
physicians follow certain guidelines promulgated by the plan as a
condition of participation in the health plan.73 Failure to follow
the guidelines can cause the physician to be terminated from par-
ticipation. This technique does not directly involve the plan in
medical decision making for individual patients, and it is less
visible to the patient, but it does restrict the ability of the physi-
cian to be patient-centered. The physician also has an incentive
to comply with the mandate - comply or face termination from
the plan - and becomes more closely aligned with the societal
interest.
B. Indirect Influences on Medical Decision Making
Indirect influences on medical decision making include the
use of physician profiling to monitor physician performance and
the use of financial incentives. Some of these techniques enable
the health plan to compel the physician to adopt the societal in-
terest, others give the physician a strong incentive to adopt the
societal interest.
Hospital Utilization in THE MANAGED HEALTH CARE HANDBOOK 102, 104-112 (Peter R.
Kongstvedt ed., 2d ed. 1993); Vogel, supra note 66, at 52-53 (1993) (asserting that utilization
management has been proven to increase the quality of care and cut costs).
72. Peter R. Kongstvedt, Changing Provider Behavior in Managed Care Plans in THE
MANAGED HEALTH CARE HANDBOOK 91, 91 (Peter R. Kongstvedt ed., 2d ed. 1993); Vogel,
supra note 66, at 97.
73. Memorandum from Dr. E. Freidherm, Chairman of the Board, Illinois State Medi-
cal Society and C. Jonathan Shattuck, Senior Vice President of Health Care Affairs, Blue
Cross/Blue Shield of Illinois to Illinois Physicians (Feb. 24, 1994) (discussing practice guide-
line implementation by Blue Cross/Blue Shield). See also Jim Montague, Illinois Blue Cross
and Blue Shield Medical Director Arnold Widen, Hosp. & HEALrH NmtrWOaxs, Feb. 20, 1993,
at 50.
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Physician profiling involves keeping data about the treat-
ment decisions of an individual physician, and comparing that
data with the profiles of other physicians or with practice guide-
lines.74 Physicians who recommend more medical services than
their peers, or who appear to be practicing outside the scope of
practice guidelines, are informed of this and are asked to change
their practice patterns to become more closely aligned with the
societal interest. Physicians who do not change their patterns af-
ter being given an opportunity to do so may be terminated from
the panel. Sometimes plans terminate physicians who recommend
more services than others without giving them an opportunity to
modify their practice patterns.75
The profiling technique does not involve the health plan in
medical decisions for individual patients, and it is not visible to
the patient. However, this technique influences how physicians
practice, and it restricts the ability of the physician to be patient-
centered. It is particularly effective in eliciting physician cooper-
ation in markets where there is an oversupply of physicians, as
physicians in such markets fear that they will not be able to
practice medicine if they are terminated from the panels of
health plans. Application of the profiling technique, together with
the threat of termination in markets with a physician surplus,
strongly aligns the physician with the societal interest.
Financial incentives include fee withhold arrangements, cap-
itation, and others. Health plans using fee withhold arrangements
set goals for participating physicians for the use of resources. A
portion of the physician's fee for each patient encounter is with-
held, ranging from fifteen percent to thirty percent, and is paid to
the physician if the goal for resource usage is met. If the goal is
exceeded, then the amount withheld is kept by the plan. The in-
tensity of the incentive to withhold care experienced by the phy-
sician depends on a number of factors that vary from arrange-
ment to arrangement, such as the number of patients involved,
the number of physicians subject to the withhold arrangement,
74. See BLUE CROSS BLUE SHIELD ASS'N, PROVIDER PROFILING: A GUIDE TO DEVELOP.
mEmr 3, 15-17 (1991) (outlining various aspects of physician profiling); Profiling Physician
Practices: A Keystone to Managed Care, PRoDucr Momr. TODAY, June 1995, at 18 (explain-
ig physician practice profiling and how it is used).
75. American Med. Ass'n, Deselection Predilection, MEDICAL STAFF AND PHYSICIAN OR-
GANIZATON LEGAL ADVISOR, Mar. 1994, at 1 (discussing the increasing practice of deselection
of physicians from plans without notice or disclosed criteria).
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the time period over which the resource usage goal is set, and
the percentage size of the withhold.76
Financial withholds are generally not visible to the patient,
and do not bring the patient directly into conflict with the plan.
However, because the intensity of the incentive to withhold is
often low in these arrangements, they may not strongly align the
physician with the societal interest. As a result, withholds are
usually combined with utilization review, profiling, and/or the
threat of termination. Combining these techniques can influence
the physician to be strongly aligned with the societal interest.
Capitation involves assigning patients to a physician and
paying the physician a flat amount of money for each patient for
a set period of time. The result is a pool of funds that is re-
ceived by the physician. Payments are usually made to the physi-
cian on a per member, per month basis. If the patients assigned
to the physician use less money than is in the pool, then the phy-
sician profits for that period of time. If the patients use more re-
sources than the money in the pool, then the physician loses
money.
7 7
Capitation is a powerful means of aligning the physician
with the societal interest. The financial interests of the physician
then coincide with the health plan, because the physician loses
potential profit every time the physician provides services for the
assigned patients. 78 There is significant variation in capitation
76. See, e.g., Arnold Milstein et al., In Pursuit of Value: American Utilization Manage-
ment at the Fifteen-Year Mark, in MAKING MANAGED HEALTHCARE WoRK: A PRACTICAL
GUIDE TO STRATEGIES AND SoLtrnoNs 371, 374 (1991) (finding that physician behavior was
not modified by a 10% withhold applicable only to a small number of patients); Maria K.
Gordon & Randall P. Herman, Appropriate Reimbursement Methodologies for Managed Care
Systems, in MAKING MANAGED HEALTHCARE WoRK: A PRACTICAL GUIDE TO STRATEGIES AND
SOLUTnNs 331, 337-39 (1991) (suggesting that if physicians do not expect a withhold to be
returned to them, they may view the withhold as a discount on fee-for-service and increase
the volume of services they provide to patients in order to increase their total reimburse-
ment); Alan L. Hickman et al., How Do Financial Incentives Affect Physicians' Clinical De-
cisions and the Financial Performance of Health Maintenance Organizations?, 321 NEw ENG.
J. MED. 86, 90 (1989) (asserting that the higher the proportion of HMO patients in a physi-
cian's practice, the greater the likelihood of his knowledge of HMO practices); Stephen H.
Moore et al., Does the Primary-Care Gatekeeper Control the Costs of Health Care? Lessons
from the SAFECO Experience, 309 NEw ENG. J. ME. 1400 (1983) (suggesting that small fi-
nancial incentives do not change physicians' behavior); Letter from Mark J. Horoschak, As-
sistant Director, Federal Trade Commission to Paul W. McVay, President, ACMG, Inc. (July
5, 1994) (on file with the American Medical Association).
77. DAVID W. LEE. AM EiCAN MED. ASS'N, CAPITATiON: THE PHYSICIANS' GUIDE 7-9
(1995) (describing the physician's risks within a capitated payment system).
78. Id. at 8 (describing the risks of lost profits resulting from capitated payments).
Wointer 1996]
HEALTH MATRIX
which can Yary the intensity of this technique. For example, a
physician may contract to accept capitation for a limited set of
services. It may benefit the physician to refer patients to other
providers as much as possible in order to avoid the expense of
caring for the patients involved.
Alternatively, the physician may accept capitation for more
services than the physician can provide, and may subcontract
with other providers to provide the additional services. The phy-
sician profits more if the physician does not have to refer the pa-
tient to these other providers. This kind of arrangement, some-
times called "global capitation, ' ' 79 gives the physician a powerful
incentive to minimize the amount of care that the physician pro-
vides to patients and to minimize referrals to other providers.
Global capitation strongly aligns the interests of the physician
with the societal interest. The nature of the alignment is not visi-
ble to the patient.
Different kinds of health plans are characterized by the
kinds of techniques that they use to eliminate unnecessary care.80
The traditional indemnity health plan does not use any of these
techniques and relies entirely on physician judgment to determine
what is necessary. Managed indemnity plans generally apply util-
ization review, and may also apply case management procedures
or mandated practice guidelines. The preferred provider organiza-
tion (PPO) generally applies the aforementioned techniques and
also restricts the size of its panel - physicians who do not in-
corporate the societal interest in their medical decisions are
likely to be terminated from the panels. Health maintenance or-
ganizations use all of the aforementioned techniques and finan-
cial incentives. Some limit themselves to fee withhold arrange-
ments, others use capitation.
Use of techniques to eliminate unnecessary care also affects
the choice of providers that is available to patients. Under tradi-
tional indemnity plans and managed indemnity plans, patients
generally have an unlimited choice of providers. PPOs also allow
unlimited choice, but the patient has a financial incentive to use
79. Patrick K. O'Hare, State Laws Can Frustrate IHS Development: Integrated Health-
care Systems, HEALTHCARE FIN. MGarr. Oct. 1994, at 20 (explaining global capitation).
80. See generally CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFF cF EFFEcrs OF MANAGED CARE_ AN Up-
DATE 1 (1994) (describing procedures used by different health care organizations to cut costs
and reduce unnecessary health care).
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the providers that are on a panel selected by the PPO. 1 The pa-
tient is reimbursed a larger percentage of the cost of care when
using a PPO provider than when using a non-PPO provider.
When the care provided is expensive, the use of a non-PPO pro-
vider may be prohibitively expensive for most patients.
Health maintenance organizations (HMOs) restrict the
choice of providers available to those on its provider panel. In
addition, most HMOs assign patients to a primary care physician
known as the "gatekeeper," and patients must see the gatekeeper
for all health care problems. The patient may .not initiate a visit
to a specialist without seeing the gatekeeper; all visits to special-
ists must be authorized by the gatekeeper. Further, the choice of
primary care physicians and specialists available to patients var-
ies according to the type of HMO. Some HMOs contract with
associations of independent physicians known as independent
practice associations (IPAs) to deliver care, and these associa-
tions often have very large panels of physicians. Other HMOs
contract with a single multispecialty group practice to provide
care, and still others employ the physicians that provide the bulk
of care to the HMO patients.
The purpose of restricting patient choice is two-fold. As dis-
cussed above, limiting the number of physicians induces them to
identify more with the societal interest being promoted by the
health plan. Restricting patient choice to those physicians assures
that the health plan will not have to pay for health care rendered
by providers who do not identify with the societal interest.
VIII. NECESSITY DETERMINATIONS UNDER THE
MARKET MODEL
Necessity determinations are not made in a vacuum. They
can be made in the context of government-administered health
benefits programs, as has been done under the Medicare pro-
gram, or they can be made in the context of the market. During
recent years, our society has favored use of the market model as
opposed to the government model. That means health plans make
necessity determinations in the context of competition with each
other for the patronage of beneficiaries.
81. Eric R. Wagner, Types of Managed Care Organizations, in THE MANAGED HEALTH
CARE HANDBOOK 12, 14 (Peter R. Kongstvedt ed., 2d ed. 1993) (describing types of managed
care providers and the continually evolving hybrids of existing systems).
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Competition is based on a variety of factors, including pre-
mium level, extent of coverage for the premium, and how wide a
choice of providers is available under a health plan. Health plans
vary widely in how they balance these factors. Generally health
plans that offer the widest choice of providers with the least re-
strictions on medical decisions by those providers are the most
expensive. Those with the greatest restrictions on choice of prov-
iders and those which exert the greatest control over medical de-
cisions by the providers have the lowest premiums.8 2 Therefore,
the patient faces a trade-off. The patient can pay more for a
health plan with a wide range of providers that are patient-cen-
tered, or the patient can pay less and get a health plan that re-
stricts the choice of providers available to those who cooperate
with the health plan's efforts to inject the societal interest into
medical decision making.83
During recent years, increasing costs have made premium
levels a very important factor in patient selection of health plans.
A larger number of patients have become willing to accept re-
strictions on their choice of providers in order to obtain lower
premium levels. Health plans that restrict the choice of provider
and offer lower premiums have grown rapidly at the expense of
more expensive health plans that offer a wider choice. In 1980
there were only a small number of persons enrolled in PPOs and
9.7 million persons enrolled in HMOs. As of 1995, over sixty
million Americans were enrolled in PPOs and fifty-five million
in HEMOs.
84
The increase in Americans enrolled in plans with restricted
panels of providers has sparked greater competition among phy-
sicians and other providers. Providers fear that they will not be
82. For an estimate of the extent to which certain kinds of Health Maintenance Organi-
zations that restrict choice can lower costs, see Verdon S. Staines, Potential Impact of Man-
aged Care on National Health Spending, HEALH AFF., Supp. 1993, at 248. See also Maureen
Cameron, Indemnity Plans Costs Rise While Managed Care Prices Moderate, Bus. &
HEALTH, Apr. 1993, at 22 (comparing indemnity and managed care plan costs, and describing
managed care actions and utilization); Norma Harris, Managed Care is Right Course Employ-
ers Say, Bus. & HEALT, July 1992, at 32 (reporting poll indicating employers' belief that
managed care can control costs and citing employers' views on how to cut costs).
83. For a description of the features of different kinds of health plans that purchasers
face in deciding upon a health plan, see Jonathan P. Weiner & Gregory de Lissovoy, Raising
a Tower of Babel: A Taxonomy for Managed Care and Health Insurance Plans, 18 J. HEALTH
POL POL'Y & L. 75, 86-90 (1993).
84. AMCRA Foundation, 1994-95 MANAGED CARE OvERvIEw 9, 27 (1995); AMY BEaN-
STEIN ET AL, 1994 HMO PERFORMANCE REPORT GROUP HEALTH ASS'N OF AM. 1 (1994);
MARION MERRILL Dow, INC. MANAGED CARE DIGEsT/PPO EDITION 3 (1993).
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able to acquire enough patients to be viable if they do not be-
come part of PPO and HMO panels. Therefore, they have be-
come willing to compete with respect to two factors of great im-
portance to health plans. First, they have become willing to
discount their fees and charges and to accept fee withhold ar-
rangements and capitation in order to attract health plans. Sec-
ond, and more important, they have become willing to incorpo-
rate the societal interest in their medical decisions in order to
gain access to health plan panels."
As competition among health plans intensifies in a market,
they look for ways to lower costs more in order to gain an ad-
vantage over their competitors. To do this, they push providers to
lower fees, charges, capitation rates,86 or other forms of payment
and to find ways to eliminate the provision of more services by
broadening the definition of unnecessary care. In markets with a
physician surplus, the physicians find themselves under intense
economic pressure to comply with these demands.87
Under ideal market conditions, health plans and physicians
would have standards of necessity that could be used as refer-
ence points for how they reduce costs. These standards would
place a floor below which physicians could not go in refash-
ioning what constitutes necessary care. Health plans and provid-
ers would then have to focus exclusively on the efficiency with
which care was delivered. However, as discussed earlier, such
standards will not be available in the near future. As a result,
different health plans and different providers have different
thresholds for what constitutes unnecessary care. In other words,
some health plans require a higher percentage likelihood that a
medical service will benefit patients before it will be covered.
Clark C. Havighurst has argued that patients should be able
to contract for the threshold of necessity for which they are will-
ing to pay. Contracting for different levels of necessity means
contracting for different levels of risk, because as concepts of ne-
cessity become more restrictive, the level of risk to individual
patients rises. Havighurst has argued that patients could review
the medical policies of health plans and compare those policies
85. MIHAEL G. MAcDoNALD E AL, Hi.ALTH CARE LAW: A PRACTIcAL GUIDE 2 (1985).
86. Frank Cerne, Cash Kings, Hosp. & HEALTH NETwoRKs, Apr. 5, 1991, at 51 (dis-
cussing the controversy surrounding the growing economic power of HMOs and their meth-
ods of lowering costs to gain an advantage over their competitors.)
87. Federico, supra, note 69.
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against premium levels in making their purchasing decisions. In-
stead of there being a generally understood societal standard for
necessity that is the minimum amount of risk that any patient
could take, each patient could decide upon the level of risk that
the patient was willing to accept.88
The Havighurst alternative sounds radical, and also appears
to contravene concepts of equality. Patients with less money
could be forced to accept low-priced health plans that carried a
high level of risk, while wealthier patients would be able to af-
ford more expensive health plans with lower levels of risk. How-
ever, this alternative is in fact the one that is prevailing today.
Patients unwilling or unable to pay for more expensive health
plans purchase HMOs or PPOs. The physicians on the panels of
HMOs and PPOs have incorporated the societal interest in con-
serving health care to a higher degree than those who see pa-
tients under managed indemnity or traditional indemnity plans.
And as discussed earlier, there are variations even within PPOs
and HMOs.
However, the Havighurst alternative is being implemented
without the benefit of the flow of information that Havighurst
envisioned in his suggestion. Patients do not receive a set of
medical policies that they can compare in purchasing health
plans, and they do not receive a set of outcomes data that com-
pares the performance of plans. The information that they receive
is the price of the plan, the restrictions placed on the choice of
physicians that may be seen, and the identities of the physicians
who may be selected.8 9 Patients may receive information about
utilization review procedures that places obligations on them,
such as the need to obtain authorization for hospitalization, but
they generally do not receive information about the pressures of
incentives that physicians are working under to incorporate the
societal interest in medical decisions.
It is debatable whether patients understand the differences in
necessity thresholds among health plans. Certainly some patients
understand that, but it appears that the bulk of the patients are
not even aware of the physician's cooperation with the societal
88. Clark C. Havinghurst, Altering the Applicable Standard of Care, 49 LAW & CoN-
TEMP. PROBS. 265, 274-75 (1986) (arguing that patients should have room to choose the physi-
cian standards they feel are most appropriate at an early point in their insurance transaction).
89. William Sherman, The 'Cookbooks': Docs Use Recipe for Cut-Rate Care, N.Y.
PosT, Sept. 20, 1995, at 4.
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interest, and are not aware of the techniques used to engender
this cooperation or of how some techniques elicit a greater
amount of cooperation than others. That means patients do not
know what they are purchasing when they select a health plan.
IX. THE POTENTIAL DANGER TO PATIENTS
Health plans have been successful in eliminating substantial
amounts of care. The largest amount of care eliminated has been
reduced use of hospitals ° Patients are not admitted to hospitals
as frequently as in prior years and if admitted, they do not stay
in as long. Reduced admissions result from the substitution of al-
ternative treatments for procedures formerly performed in the
hospital and from decisions not to treat. Savings also result from
the increased use of primary care physicians who are generally
less expensive than specialists.
Further, it appears that substantial amounts of care can still
be eliminated through the application of techniques to reduce the
provision of unnecessary services in numerous markets where
these techniques are not common. Most of the savings have been
achieved in markets where PPOs and HMOs have achieved large
market shares, and the highest degree of savings have come from
markets where HMOs have achieved high market shares and
where capitation arrangements with physicians have become
prevalent. If the savings achieved in markets where HMOs and
capitation are prevalent are extrapolated to the rest of the United
States, where HMOs and capitation arrangements are less preva-
lent, then it is clear that additional medical services can be
eliminated.91
The savings achieved by the application of techniques to
eliminate unnecessary care have been achieved without any ap-
parent large scale degradation of the quality of patient outcomes.
In fact, most studies that compare the outcomes of medical care
provided by health plans that limit care to the outcomes resulting
from traditional fee-for-service plans have concluded that the
outcomes of plans that limit care are no different than or better
90. MILLIMAN & ROBERTSON. INC.. PRACTICE GUIDELINES: QUALrry CARE IN A COST-EF-
FiCiNr MANNEm (1994).
91. See generally Samuel M. Holtzman, Redesigning the Health Care Delivery System,
Address at the Illinois Association of Healthcare Attorneys Twelfth Annual Health Law Sym-
posium (Oct. 12, 1994).
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than care provided through fee-for-service plans.9 2 From these re-
suits, one might conclude that there is an optimal amount of
health care for any given patient, and that traditional health plans
may have resulted in the provision of too much care to the detri-
ment of patients.
However, these studies are not consistent with a substantial
number of anecdotal reports about patient harm caused by the
withholding of medical care by health plans. During 1995, the
Los Angeles Times,93 the New York Post,94 and Newsweek maga-
zine95 have featured expos6s on adverse patient incidents caused
by withholding care; a major television network had a series of
reports that featured patient care problems attributable to health
plans;96 and there have been many other media reports about
these incidents.
There are several reasons why the studies differ from the
anecdotal reports. One reason is that many of the adverse inci-
dents reported in the media did not in fact result in an adverse
patient outcome. These are incidents where a PPO or HMO re-
fused to provide the care recommended by a physician or desired
by the patient. Subsequently one of two courses of events oc-
curred. One is that the patient's symptoms worsened making it
obvious care was necessary, the care was then authorized by the
plan, and the patient recovered satisfactorily. No harm occurred
to the patient, but the patient had a frustrating and frightening
experience.
The other scenario is that the patient obtained the desired
care outside of the health plan. A good example of this is the ex-
perience of the Christy family whose daughter was diagnosed
with Wilm's tumor. That disease is curable with an operation, but
92. For a summary of the results of these studies, see David Orentlicher, Health Care
Reform and the Patient-Physician Relationship, 5 HEALTH MATrix 141, 161-66 (1995). But
see JoHN E. WARE Er A.., Differences in 4-year Health Outcomes for Elderly and Poor,
Chronically Il Patients Treated in HMO and Fee for Service Systems, 276 JAMA 1039
(1996), (finding that elderly and poor chronically ill patients have worse physical health out-
comes in HMOs than in fee-for-service systems).
93. Michael A. Hiltzik & David R. Olmos, The Health Care Revolution: Remaking
Medicine in California (pts. 1-14), L.A. TImEs, Aug. 27-Aug. 31, 1995 (reporting the results
of a 14-month investigation into managed care).
94. Sherman, supra note 89.
95. Ellyn E. Spragins, Beware Your HMO, NEwsWEEK, Oct. 23, 1995, at 54 (exploring
conflicts between HMO physicians and their patients).
96. CBS Evening News With Dan Rather: Eye on America (CBS television broadcast,
July 24-26, 1995) (discussing various problems encountered by HMO consumers).
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the operation is technically very difficult. The HMO involved in-
sisted that it be performed by a general surgeon who did not
have any experience with the operation. The Christy family
wanted a pediatric surgeon with experience. The family hired the
pediatric surgeon and the girl recovered.97 The HMO was subse-
quently penalized by the California Department of Corporations
for withholding necessary care.9 8 Again, the family had a frus-
trating and frightening experience, but no harm came to the
patient.
These kinds of incidents, because the patient was not
harmed, would not show up in studies of patient outcomes. How-
ever, there are also incidents where the patient clearly was
harmed. Given the incentives to conserve care, it seems inevita-
ble that mistakes will occur and that care will be withheld when
it should not be. It may be that these incidents are not numerous
enough to affect the results of aggregate outcomes. However,
like malpractice incidents under conventional fee-for-service
medicine, they may generate substantial public attention when
they do occur.
Another reason is that the studies might not be representa-
tive of health plans as a whole. Different health plans use differ-
ent criteria to determine necessity, they have different pressures
on and incentives for physicians to withhold care, and they use
different physicians. Therefore, studies which are limited to com-
paring a small number of health plans may miss a substantial
amount of adverse care resulting from the application of tech-
niques to eliminate unnecessary care.
The most likely explanation for the difference in the studies
and the anecdotal reports is probably a combination of the above
reasons. Patients and the public are disturbed by the withholding
of care that did not result in harm, but was a "near miss" or
demonstrated a willingness to take risks with patient well-being
that seemed unacceptable (such as the Christy incident described
above). Patients and the public believe that it is inevitable that
such near misses or willingness to take risks with patient care
97. Fran Smith, The Patient Will See You Now, SAN JosE MERcURy NEws, Mar. 11,
1994, at 10.
98. Department of Corporations Announced Enforcement Action Against California
HMO, NEws RELEASE 97-21 (State of Cal. Bus., Transp. and Housing Agency, Dep't of
Corp.) Nov. 17, 1994, at 1. The enforcement action announced in this news release is still be-
ing contested by the TakeCare Health Plan.
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will eventually result in some incidents where patients are in fact
harmed. Some incidents of adverse care do occur, and there are
HMOs or PPOs where the managers and physicians are too ag-
gressive in withholding care.
Although studies of HMOs have not shown adverse out-
comes in the aggregate, the existence of the anecdotal reports of
adverse incidents due to the withholding of care is of concern.
The reason is that, for the most part, HMOs and PPOs have not
yet been put under severe economic pressure. If anecdotal reports
of adverse incidents abound now, then the amount of those inci-
dents is likely to increase when HMOs and PPOs are put under
severe economic pressure and press providers for increasingly re-
strictive interpretations of what constitutes necessary care.
HMOs and PPOs have not been put under severe pressure
because they have had a substantial cost advantage over tradi-
tional fee-for-service medicine due to their ability to eliminate
unnecessary care. HMOs and PPOs have been able to grow at a
rapid rate by taking market share from indemnity plans, and they
have been able to generate substantial profits. In most markets,
they have not been forced to engage in intense competition with
each other.99 When they have to compete more directly with each
other for market share, and increases in market share for one
HMO or PPO come at the expense of other HMOs or PPOs,
profits will decline and some HMOs and PPOs will be forced
from the market. At that point they will be under severe eco-
nomic pressure to find ways to gain cost advantages over each
other, and will continue to press for ways to eliminate more un-
necessary care.
However, it will become increasingly difficult for HMOs
and PPOs to find ways to reduce costs. Many health care econo-
mists believe that the savings achieved by HMOs and PPOs are
not sustainable on a long-term basis. At some point they will
have succeeded in eliminating virtually all of the unnecessary
care from the system. However, expenses will continue to in-
99. During the period 1992-1994, the growth rate in HMO premiums per member de-
clined from 10.6% to 5.6%, and it is projected that there will be an absolute decline in per
member premiums of -1.5% during 1995. See BERNsaTrEiN r AL, supra note 84, at 9. See also
U.S. CONGRESS, OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, MANAGED CARE AND COMPETITIVE
HEALTH CARE MARKETS: THE TWIN CITIES EXPERIENCE 2-4, 22 (indicating that the recent
overall rate of increase is low, and that HMO competition is not necessarily intense).
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crease due to advances in medical technology.100 Purchasers of
health plans will continue to be heavily influenced by premium
levels, as they will want to find ways to reduce the rate of in-
crease of their health care expenditures. This will cause HMOs
and PPOs severe economic pressure.
Similarly, providers will come under serious economic pres-
sure. There is already evidence of a physician surplus and excess
hospital capacity in many markets in the United States. 0 1 Health
care economists predict that the surplus and excess capacity will
become much larger than it is today. That will force providers
into intense competition with each other in order to have enough
patient volume to remain viable in the market. As that occurs,
providers will be vulnerable to pressures from health plans to
eliminate more unnecessary care, and will be tempted to employ
increasingly strict definitions of what constitutes necessary care
and to withhold care that may be needed by patients.
Two factors may prevent severe economic pressures on
health plans and providers from withholding so much care that
patients are harmed. One is that additional progress in saving
health care resources may be yielded in prevention and efficien-
cies in delivering health care. Prevention techniques might in-
clude efforts to encourage patients to avoid poor diets and other
behavior that puts health at risk, screening populations to identify
risk factors and then assisting patients with risk factors to mini-
mize the likelihood of disease, or managing patients with chronic
illnesses to minimize the adverse effects.10 Very few health plans
make heavy use of these techniques, yet they may result in addi-
tional savings by preventing the need for expensive medical
services.
However, the extent to which savings may be achieved by
prevention techniques is still theoretical. It is not known whether
they will be significant. Further, like the elimination of unneces-
sary care, it is likely that the extent of savings that can be
achieved with these techniques has limits, and only postpones the
100. Schwartz, supra note 46; Rettig, supra note 46; Garber, supra note 46.
101. Jonathan P. Weiner, Forecasting the Effects of Health Reform on U.S. Physician
Workforce Requirement: Evidence from HMO Staffing Patterns, 272 JAMA 222, 229 (1994)
(predicting a surplus of 165,000 patient care physicians by the year 2000); Frank Cerne,
Shaping up for Capitation, Hosp. & HFrALTH NurwoRKs (1994) at 28, 29.
102. See David Lawrence, The Market is Already Doing It, WALL ST. J., Mar. 16, 1994,
at A18 (extolling the financial successes and quality of care provided by the managed-care
market as positive reform).
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time that health plans exhaust their ability to gain cost advan-
tages over other health plans.
The other factor is buyer resistance. Once purchasers start to
have adverse experiences with a health plan, they are likely to
abandon it and turn to health plans that offer higher quality. Pur-
chasers will not turn to plans with lower prices if they fear that
the quality of those plans is so poor that they might be harmed.
Therefore, if levels of quality start to degrade, the market is
likely to correct itself as purchasers realize that the tradeoff in
price is not worth the risk of adverse events.
However, there is a problem with relying on the ability of
the market to correct levels of quality that are unacceptably low.
There is likely to be a time lag during the period when quality
degrades and purchasers become aware of the degradation and
force health plans to correct the problem. This time period could
be lengthened because of the lack of information available to
purchasers about the policies and performance of health plans.
The lack of information will increase the amount of time it takes
for visible evidence of a degradation in quality to build up. Dur-
ing that period, many patients could be harmed.
The kind of dynamics described above are normal for many
markets, and the swings in price and quality that occur are con-
sidered to be acceptable. However, because of the importance of
health care to life and the enjoyment of life, these dynamics may
not be acceptable for health care.
X. LACK OF LEGAL RESTRAINTS ON HEALTH PLANS:
EVOLUTION OF THE LEGAL SYSTEM TO FACILITATE
THE SOCIETAL INTEREST
As has been demonstrated above, legal and moral accounta-
bility historically rested with physicians as the primary providers
of care. This responsibility led to certain developments in the le-
gal system, including malpractice and tort liability, the corporate
bar on the practice of medicine, and the establishment of a hos-
pital medical staff structure, all directed at the supremacy of the
patient interest. As the market and alternative health care deliv-
ery models have developed, the legal system has modified this
structure to facilitate the ability of health plans to assert the soci-
etal interest in medical decisions. In particular, the liability of
health plans for harm to patients resulting from the withholding
of medical care is limited. It exists; there are theories that pa-
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tients can pursue; but they are not nearly as well-established as
the malpractice liability of physicians. These theories are difficult
to use because the theories themselves are subject to challenge
when lawsuits are brought by patients. Patients must first survive
a battle over whether the theory applies and can be used against
a health plan before they can begin to prove the facts establish-
ing the elements of the theory.
However, the legal system has not facilitated the ability of
physicians to incorporate the societal interest. Although the med-
ical decisions of patients are controlled by or heavily influenced
by health plans, physicians remain ultimately liable for the medi-
cal decisions made in the care of patients, and they are required
to place the interests of the patient above all other considera-
tions. There has been no real change in that aspect of malprac-
tice law. 03 Therefore, the law has facilitated a scenario where
health plans can use economic leverage to pressure physicians
into incorporating the societal interest into medical decisions
without clear liability, and where physicians are responsible for
resisting this pressure when withholding care would lead to pa-
103. A number of commentators have written articles about the tension that physicians
experience between meeting the demands of health plans to conserve the use of health care
resources and the continuing demand of the malpractice laws that physicians do all that they
can to ameliorate the illnesses or injuries of patients. Some of these commentators propose
that changes be made in the liability laws. See, e.g., Jonathan J. Frankel, Note, Medical Mal-
practice Law and Health Care Cost Containment: Lessons for Reformers from the Clash of
Cultures, 103 YALE LJ. 1297 (1994) (proposing to reform medical malpractice laws to allow
variations in the standard of care); Mark A. Hall, The Malpractice Standard Under Health
Care Cost Containment, 17 LAw MED. & HALTH CARE 347 (1989) (discussing the conflict
between malpractice law and cost containment); Robert C. Macaulay, Jr., Health Care Cost
Containment and Medical Malpractice: On a Collision Course, 21 SuFFoLK U. L. REv. 91,
103-07 (1986) (discussing how cost containment efforts by health care providers leads to an
increase in the standard for proving liability); E. Haavi Morreim, Cost Containment and the
Standard of Medical Care, 75 CA. L REv. 1719 (1987) (finding traditional rules of malprac-
tice law inadequate to resolve the medical care cost-cutting dilemma) [hereinafter Morreim,
Cost Containment]; E. Haavi Morreim, Stratified Scarcity: Redefining the Standard of Care,
17 LAW MED. & HEALT CARE 356 (1989) (scrutinizing traditional insistence that physicians
owe all their patients equal minimum standard of care) [hereinafter Morreim, Scarcity]; Note,
Rethinking Medical Malpractice Law in Light of Medicare Cost-Cutting, 98 HARv. L. REv.
1004, 1017-19 (1985) (offering solutions to the friction between malpractice laws and medical
cost reduction). See also Aalirag J. Lairson, Comment, Reexamining the Physician's Duty of
Care in Response to Medicare's Prospective Payment System, 62 WAsH. L. REv. 791, 804
(1987); Diana Vance-Bryan, Note, Medicare's Prospective Payment System: Can Quality Care
Survive?, 69 IowA L REv. 1417 (1984); James F. Blumstein, Rationing Medical Resources: A
Constitutional, Legal, and Policy Analysis, 59 TEx. L. REv. 1345 (1981); Rand E. Rosenblat,
Rationing "Normal" Health Care: The Hidden Legal Issues, 59 Te. L. REv. 1401 (1981);
Peter H. Schuck, Malpractice Liability and the Rationing of Care, 59 TEx. L. REv. 1421
(1981).
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tient harm. This division of liability does not adequately protect
patients. The physician does not have the economic leverage or
the legal rights necessary to adequately withstand the economic
leverage of health plans. Given this legal environment, it is inev-
itable that some patients will be harmed.
The following sections explain the current structure of the
law on these issues.
XI. ERISA
The Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974
(ERISA) governs self-insured health plans in which the employer
pays for health care directly, rather than purchasing insurance
coverage for its employees. Over half of all employees in the
United States receive their health coverage through self-insured
plans and over two-thirds of all employers self-insure. ERISA
preempts state tort law; practically, this has meant that there is
controversy over whether health plans and employers can be held
liable for patient injury caused by the withholding of necessary
care. 
104
Corcoran v. United Healthcare, Inc.10 5 illustrates this di-
lemma. The plaintiff had a high-risk pregnancy (her second),
during which her physician decided hospitalization prior to deliv-
ery was required so that mother and fetus could be continuously
monitored. Preauthorization of hospitalization was required of
United Healthcare, which in this instance was acting as the utili-
zation reviewer for the plan administrator under a self-insured
plan. United Healthcare determined that hospitalization for Mrs.
Corcoran was not called for, but authorized home care for ten
hours a day instead. At a point when a nurse was not present,
Mrs. Corcoran's fetus went into distress and died. Plaintiff filed
a wrongful death action against United Healthcare and the plan
administrator, alleging that the unborn child died as a result of
their negligence. The court granted summary judgment for the
defendant because ERISA contains an express clause preempting
all state laws as they relate to employee benefit plans. Because
104. 29 U.S.C. §1144(a) (1994) (providing that ERISA supersedes all state laws that
relate to employee benefit plans). For a discussion of the controversy in this area, see David
D. Griner, Note, Paying the Piper: Third-Party Payor Liability for Medical Treatment Deci-
sions, 25 GA. L. REv. 861, 912-21 (1991) (discussing ERISA as the most significant legal
barrier to application of third-party payor liability for negligence).
105. 965 F.2d 1321 (5th Cir. 1992).
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the injury arose as a result of a "benefits" determination, the
plaintiffs had no remedy. 106
ERISA, however, does not preempt a "generally applicable
statute that makes no reference to, or indeed functions irrespec-
tive of, the existence of an ERISA plan." 107 If the state law is
viewed as affecting an employee benefit plan in "too tenuous,
remote, or peripheral a manner"' 0 8 it will not be preempted as it
relates to the plan. Accordingly, two circuit courts have recently
found that suits based on theories of vicarious liability, ostensible
agency, and direct negligence by HMOs could be heard in state
courts.'09 In Dukes v. U.S. Healthcare, Inc., the court drew a dis-
tinction between a claim about the quality of a benefit received
and the receipt of the benefit itself."10
Finally, the Supreme Court recently found in New York
State Conference of Blue Cross & Blue Shield v. Travelers Insur-
ance Co.,' that ERISA did not preempt a New York hospital
surcharge tax, even when those taxes affected self-insured benefit
plans." 2 This decision seems to indicate that the broader the
scope of state regulation, the less likely it is that the state action
will be preempted by ERISA, on the grounds that such action is
not specifically designed to reach ERISA plans.
The conclusion of all this is that health plan liability for
medical decisions is uncertain. Given the vast number of health
plans that fall under the jurisdiction of ERISA, this controversy
leaves vast numbers of patients without a clear remedy against
the health plan.
XII. LACK OF CLEAR TORT LIABILITY OF HEALTH
PLANS FOR MEDICAL DECISION MAKING
Not all health plans are protected from tort liability by ER-
ISA, although when plans are found liable, such liability has
106. See also Kuhl v. Lincoln Nat'l Health Plan, 999 F.2d 298 (8th Cir. 1993) (deter-
mining that state law claims arising from administration of medical plans are preempted as
claims that "relate" to ERISA).
107. Ingersoll-Rand Co. v. McClendon, 498 U.S. 133, 139 (1990).
108. Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, 463 U.S. 85, 100 n.21 (1983).
109. Pacificare of Oklahoma, Inc. v. Burrage, 59 F.3d 151, 154-55 (10th Cir. 1995);
Dukes v. U.S. Healthcare, Inc., 57 F.3d 350, 351-52 (3d Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct.
564 (1995).
110. Dukes, 57 F.3d at 357.
111. 115 S. Ct. 1671 (1995)
112. Id.
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been very narrowly drawn. One leading case held a health plan
accountable for an action that directly resulted in an adverse in-
fluence on an individual treatment decision, Wilson v. Blue
Cross.113 However, in another leading case, where patient injury
resulted from a plan's denial of treatment, but where the physi-
cian did not exhaust the plan's appeal process, the health plan
was absolved of liability.1 4 In this way, health plan accountabil-
ity and liability have been limited. These cases demonstrate the
controversy over the extent of health plan liability. These two
cases are considered to be leading cases because, other than
these opinions, there are very few reported decisions about the li-
ability of health plans for medical decisions." 5 The reasons may
be that the liability of the physician is clear, the liability of the
health plan is uncertain, and therefore it is easier to pursue the
physician in the event of patient harm.
Other legal theories could be employed to find health plans
liable for their adverse influence on medical decision making.
Under the theory of respondeat superior, an employer is respon-
sible for its employee's actions when the employee is controlled
by the employer. However, this theory is applicable only if phy-
sicians are employees. Only 4.6% of all HMOs used the staff
model as of 1993,116 and many of those HMOs have primary
care physicians only as employees and contract with independent
physicians for specialty care.
Breach of contract or breach of warranty theories are an-
other option. Under such theories, the health plan would be held
accountable for explicit or implicit promises made in application
materials, plan summaries, or advertising. Claims could also be
made for misrepresentation, false advertising, or breach of war-
ranty. However, these are still novel theories of liability for med-
ical decisions and are not reliable remedies for patients who have
113. 271 Cal. Rptr. 876 (Cal. Ct. App. 1990). In Wilson, a patient was hospitalized for
severe depression, drug dependency, and anorexia. The admitting physician recommended a
treatment plan that included four weeks of hospitalization. Blue Cross, however, denied cov-
erage for more than ten days; accordingly, after ten days, the patient was discharged from the
hospital and committed suicide. The family sued Blue Cross. Blue Cross claimed its action
was a determination of benefits and not a medical treatment decision, but the court rejected
this argument, finding the plan accountable when its payment decision substantially contrib-
utes to the patient's injury. Id.
114. Wickline v. State, 239 Cal. Rptr. 810 (Cal. Ct. App. 1986).
115. See Griner, supra note 104, at 911.
116. AMCRA Foundation, supra note 84, at 12.
(Vol. 6:3
MEDICAL NECESSITY DETERMINATIONS
been harmed. Recent cases have focused on the new and differ-
ent functions being performed by health plans. 117 The administra-
tive role played by the HMO" 8 guarantees that all medical costs
would be covered,' 19 or claims that physicians are competent'20
are theories that have all succeeded in recent years. Finally,
cases have emerged raising the standard of care in situations
where health plans have made representations about physicians'
credentials, some of which have been successful.1
2
'
A final potential avenue for liability is the tort of bad faith
insurance settlements. This tort is meant to cover situations
where the insurer has unreasonably withheld payment for a cov-
ered liability. It arises out of a duty of good faith and fair deal-
ing owed by the insurer to the insured. This duty does not rise to
the level of a fiduciary duty, but one commentator has observed
that it seems to approach that level in states which recognize the
tort.122 This tort has been used to sue health plans that have re-
fused to pay for health care services incurred by a beneficiary.121
However, this tort requires a higher standard of proof of wrong-
doing than does the malpractice remedy for physicians. It is not
117. Boyd v. Albert Einstein Med. Ct., 547 A.2d 1229, 1234 (Pa. Super. 1988) (stating
that "[b]ecause the role of health care providers has changed in recent years, the ... ratio-
nale for applying the theory of ostensible agency ... is certainly applicable [to HMOs]");
Health Am. v. Menton, 551 So. 2d 235 (Ala. 1989) (enforcing an HMO's promise to cover
all medical costs).
118. See Lucian L. Leape et al., The Nature of Adverse Events in Hospitalized Pa-
tients-Results of the Harvard Medical Practice Study, 324 NEw ENG. J. MED. 377 (1991)
(analyzing the frequency and nature of medical mistakes and other adverse effects in health
care environments).
119. Health Am., 551 So. 2d at 238.
120. Boyd, 547 A.2d at 1231.
121. See Shelmach v. Physicians' Multispecialty Group, No. 53906 (Mo. Ct. App. June
13, 1989) (holding that clinic is liable to beneficiary as a result of clinic's contractual promise
to HMO that it would provide "good quality" care); Depenbrok v. Kaiser Found. Health
Plan, Inc., 144 Cal. Rptr. 724 (Cal. Ct. App. 1978) (holding that breach of contract may oc-
cur where surgeon promised a particular result and patient relied on that promise); Pulvers v.
Kaiser Found. Health Plan, 160 Cal. Rptr. 392 (Cal. Ct. App. 1979) (holding that HMO ad-
vertising "high standards" of care was not liable and advertising was "generalized puffery"
that the plan physicians would exercise good judgment).
122. HARNETF & LasicK, supra note 1, § 14.0211].
123. See, e.g., Berry v. United of Omaha, 719 F.2d 1127 (1lth Cir. 1983) (holding that
an action of bad faith nonpayment by a health plan can be maintained); Hughes v. Blue
Cross, 245 Cal. Rptr. 273 (Cal. CL App. 1988) (affirming damages against insurer who
breached covenant of good faith and fair dealing when investigating insured's claim); Aetna
Life Ins. Co. v. Lavoie, 470 So. 2d 1060 (Ala. 1984), vacated and remanded, 106 S. Ct. 1580
(1986) (addressing claim against a health insurer for bad faith refusal to pay a claim); Na-
tional Say. Life Ins. Co. v. Dutton, 419 So. 2d 1357 (Ala. 1982) (addressing consumer's
claim for bad faith settlement).
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enough to show that it was error for an insurer to deny coverage
for services which turned out to be necessary. There must be a
showing of greater culpability, such as actual bad faith, reckless
disregard for rights of the beneficiary, or malice. This higher
standard of proof allows the insurer to defend by showing that
the coverage was denied due to an error or a good faith misun-
derstanding. 124 In addition, this tort is not consistently available
in all states - only about half of the states recognize it for first
party insurers z5
A. Sovereign Immunity
Medicare is administered by the Health Care Financing Ad-
ministration (HCFA), which contracts with "carriers" and "in-
termediaries" (usually insurance companies or Blue Cross/Blue
Shield entities) to process and pay claims for health care pro-
vided to an estimated 36.8 million Medicare beneficiaries. 126 Car-
riers and intermediaries are hired to retrospectively evaluate the
necessity of care provided to beneficiaries, and Peer Review Or-
ganizations (PROs) are hired to retrospectively review claims to
evaluate quality of care and identify substandard providers. 127 As
a federal agency, HCFA is protected from liability claims by the
doctrine of sovereign immunity and can be sued to the extent
permitted by the Constitution, specific federal legislation, and
federal judicial decisions. For example, the Federal Tort Claims
Act' 28 permits damage suits against federal agencies for negli-
gence and other torts, but under specifically prescribed circum-
stances, 29 and prohibits recovery for punitive damages. 30
124. See generally HARNETr & LESNICK, supra note 1, § 14.04[21(a)-(c) (discussing de-
nial of valid recovery claims by insurers such as in bad faith or a malicious manner).
125. Id. § 14.0414] (indicating that many states do not recognize tort of bad faith deal-
ing under first party insurance contracts consistently).
126. 42 U.S.C. § 1395u(a) (1994); STAFF OF HousE COMM. ON WAYS AND MEANS.
103D CONGRESS, 2D SESSION. STAFF OVERVIEW OF ENTrrLEmENT PROGRAMS 124 (Comm. Print
1994).
127. 42 U.S.C. § 1320c (1994); 1995 MEDICARE & MEDICAID GuIDE (CCH) 1[ 13,460-
13,540 (describing the retrospective claims review procedures used by Medicare).
128. 28 U.S.C. § 2674 (1994).
129. 28 U.S.C. § 2680 (1994), which states that the United States may not be sued for
Any claim based upon an act or omission of an employee of the Government, exer-
cising due care, in the execution of a statute or regulation, whether or not such stat-
ute or regulation be valid, or based upon the exercise or performance or the failure
to exercise or perform a discretionary function or duty on the part of a federal
agency or an employee of the Government, whether or not the discretion involved
be abused.
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B. Demise of the Bar on Corporate Practice
While the majority of states retain a bar on the corporate
practice of medicine,'31 corporate interests have managed to ei-
ther find a way around, through, or ignored the intent behind the
corporate bar.
For example, California has extensive precedent relating to
the corporate practice of medicine, 132 yet California is also one
of the most highly developed managed-care markets in the coun-
try, where many physicians appear to be employees of health
plans. How can this be? The answer lies in the development of
the foundation model, a structure by which physicians may be
employed by integrated delivery systems without violating the
corporate bar on the practice of medicine.
The foundation model is named after an organizational
structure in which a nonprofit foundation purchases the assets of
individual physicians or groups and then enters into long-term
service contracts with the physicians. The nonprofit foundation is
able to raise capital unavailable to the physicians through the is-
suance of bonds, which can be used not only to fund the
purchase of physician practices, but to provide information sys-
tems and the sophisticated infrastructure necessary to remain
competitive today. However, in the first foundation to clear IRS
scrutiny, only two of the ten board members could represent
physicians, thus guaranteeing the organization would not be con-
trolled by providers. 133
Often the partner in the nonprofit foundation is a for-profit
managed care or insurance company. This skirts the corporate
bar on the practice of medicine, as no for-profit corporation in
130. See 28 U.S.C. § 2674 (1994).
131. Hansen, supra note 27.
132. See Ca. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 2400 (West 1995) (proscribing the corporate prac-
tice of medicine); Pacific Employer Ins. Co. v. Carpenter, 52 P.2d 992 (1935) (holding that it
is unlawful for corporations to provide or contract out medical services); People ex rel. State
Bd. of Med. Examiners v. Pacific Health Corp., 82 P.2d 429 (1938) (allowing some lay as-
sociations and corporations to retain doctors to render medical services to members); 55 Op.
Cal. Att'y Gen. 39 (1972).
133. Harris Meyer, Who's Afraid of Vertical Integration? Foundation Model for Medi-
cal Groups Passes IRS Test, A. M D. NEws, Mar. 15, 1993, at 3, 50 (describing the IRS rul-
ing on the tax-exempt status of Friendly Hills Healthcare Foundation). In that case, Friendly
Hills Healthcare Network, a multispecialty for-profit physician group, sold its assets to a non-
profit foundation partly controlled by Loma Linda University Medical Center and contracted
with the foundation to provide medical services.
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California may lawfully employ or contract with physicians. 134
Accordingly, an argument could be made that, through use of a
corporate screen, the physicians are being employed by a for-
profit corporation - a violation of the corporate bar on the prac-
tice of medicine. Nevertheless, this model has proliferated
throughout California in the last few years.
A different approach has been taken in Colorado. In that
state, corporations are prohibited from practicing medicine; 135
however, the General Assembly has authorized the establishment
of "provider networks" involving joint ventures between physi-
cians and lay entities. 36 Three conditions must be met. First, a
written agreement between the lay entity and the physicians must
specify that the lay entity will not "affect the exercise of the li-
censed or certified professional's independent judgment in the
practice of the profession." '137 Second, the physician's "indepen-
dent judgment in the practice of [medicine] is in fact unaffected
by the relationship."'' 38 Third, the physician is not required to
take any action the physician believes is not in the patient's best
interest. 39 However, it is unclear whether these principles are
universally carried out in practice.
Not every jurisdiction has abandoned the corporate bar. Re-
cently, an Illinois court invalidated an employment contract con-
taining a noncompete clause between a surgeon and a hospital on
the grounds that the corporate bar should be strictly enforced. 4'
Under Illinois law, only contracts permitted by law may be en-
forced; accordingly, since by law the hospital could not employ
the physician, the contract was unenforceable. The judge, how-
ever, explicitly noted that the case did not involve the employ-
ment of a physician who practiced a hospital-based specialty,
such as anesthesiology, pathology, radiology, or emergency
medicine, leaving the door open for exceptions to the bar.'41
134. See supra note 132.
135. CoLo. REv. STAT. § 12-36-129, § 12-36-134 (1991) (forbidding corporations from
practicing medicine except as provided by statute).
136. CoLO. REv. STAT. § 6-18-303 (Supp. 1994) (establishing limited exceptions to
prohibitions on corporate practice of licensed health care providers).
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. Id.
140. Berlin v. Sarah Bush Lincoln Health Ctr., No. 95MR7, slip op. at 7-8 (5th Cir. I11.
June 15, 1995), affd, 664 N.E. 2d 337 (Ill. 1996).
141. See id. at 8.
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C. Lack of Medical Staff Model in Health Plans
Federal Medicare law and most state statutes relating to
hospital licensure require the hospital medical staff to be organ-
ized, providing a structure for practitioner activity within a hos-
pital. The Joint Commission on Accreditation of Healthcare Or-
ganizations, often acting as the deemed accrediting entity for
purposes of state and federal law, requires hospitals to have a
medical staff structure. The medical staff is the entity that de-
fines the responsibilities of practitioners within the hospital and
defines procedures, providing accountability. Hospital administra-
tion is separated from the provision of patient care. Laws and ac-
creditation standards requiring a hospital medical staff do so to
ensure a framework for physician input into the medical policy
development of the institution. The medical staff bylaws have
extensive rules regarding credentialing, peer review, and griev-
ance procedures designed to ensure due process for providers
and quality care for patients.
No such equivalent exists for other licensed entities - in-
eluding health plans such as HMOs - yet entities other than
hospitals are delivering or controlling a major portion of health
care services rendered in the United States. The lack of a re-
quirement for HMOs to establish a medical staff results from the
market developing rapidly beyond and around legal strictures. It
is time for statutory changes to handle this development.
XII. PROPOSED CHANGES TO THE LEGAL STRUCTURE
Changes need to be made to the legal structure to recognize
the realities of health plan control over medical decisions. The
current structure does not recognize the economic leverage that
health plans have over physicians, and the difficulty that physi-
cians will have in resisting pressures to withhold care in highly
competitive markets. Changes should focus on restoring a better
balance between health plans, physicians, and patients in medical
decisions. It should include providing information to patients on
health plan accountability, and on enabling physicians to be ad-
vocates for the patient interest.
A. Patient Information
Information for patients is more important than ever. Given
the controls and economic incentives that health plans place on
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physicians, the patient may be uncertain as to whether the patient
is receiving all relevant information about treatment options for
an illness or injury. The health plan and the physician, when
under the control or influence of the health plan, have an incen-
tive to steer the patient to the lowest cost option. It would be
ideal if there was an extensive outcomes collection and reporting
system that enabled patients to compare the cost and quality per-
formance of health plans and providers. However, this does not
exist now and the expense of such a system precludes its crea-
tion in the foreseeable future. In the absence of such a system,
health plans should be required to disclose information to pa-
tients about their own outcomes and the techniques that they use
to eliminate unnecessary care. This information should be drafted
in easily understood language so that patients can decide whether
they are comfortable with the combination of price and risk used
by the health plan.
B. Health Plan Accountability
Health plans, including ERISA plans, should be held ac-
countable for patient injury suffered from the withholding of
medical care. This accountability should exist regardless of
whether the health plan uses direct or indirect techniques to
eliminate unnecessary care. This will give health plans an incen-
tive to take care in evaluating the need for care when using tech-
niques that directly involve them in medical decisions, and to
oversee the quality of care provided when they use indirect tech-
niques. Accountability can be created by providing a clear tort
remedy for patients who feel that they have been harmed by the
withholding of care.
One suggestion for such a remedy is enterprise liability.142
Under this proposal, health plans would be liable for malpractice
committed by any of the health care providers delivering care on
its behalf, and the physician would no longer have liability. This
proposal is too extreme. First, it sweeps more broadly than is
necessary, and would make the health plan liable for malpractice
that is not attributable to the medical policies and conduct of the
health plan. It would leave physicians without any personal sense
142. Kenneth S. Abraham & Paul C. Weiler, Enterprise Medical Liability and the
Evolution of the American Health Care System, 108 HARM. L. REv. 381 (1994) (discussing en-
terprise liability as an approach to malpractice reform).
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of liability, and would require the health plan to exert even
greater controls over physicians than they do today in order to
control their malpractice exposure. This need for control could
reduce the flexibility of health plans and physicians to structure
their relationships in innovative ways.
Perhaps a better way to enhance health plan liability is to
modify the tort of bad faith insurance settlements and make it
applicable in all states. Given the role that health plans in fact
have in making and influencing medical decisions, it is time to
enhance the duty of good faith and fair dealing owed by the
health plan to the beneficiary into a fiduciary duty. This en-
hanced duty would not require the health plan to abandon any
effort to include the societal interest in medical decision making.
However, it would require the plan to be certain that the patient
is well-informed about the policies of the plan, that the physician
has the freedom to inform the patient about all of the patient's
treatment options, and that the plan must exercise care in making
medical decisions or in influencing the medical decisions of
physicians.
C. Enabling Physicians to be Advocates for the Patient Interest
Most health plans do not have vehicles to involve their par-
ticipating physicians to have input into their medical policies or
other policies that affect how the physicians practice. Health
plans generally have a medical director or even a panel of physi-
cians with whom they consult, but they do not obtain broad-
based input. Hospitals have a medical staff structure that has
served the industry very well. It has provided a means for the
physicians on the medical staff to participate in the development
of hospital policy. There should be a similar means for physi-
cians participating in a health plan to be involved in health plan
policies. This does not have to be identical to a hospital medical
staff structure, but it should provide vehicles for physicians to
meet and to elect representatives to interact with health plan
management.
Vehicles for input into health plans by participating physi-
cians will not be of any benefit to patients unless the physicians
feel free to advocate their beliefs about what constitutes good pa-
tient care. They should not have to fear being terminated from a
health plan if they advocate policies that health plan management
does not want. Therefore, there should be procedures for physi-
Wirmter 1996]
52 HEALTH MATRIX [Vol. 6:3
cians to use if they believe that they have been terminated from
a panel because of their advocacy efforts. This procedure could
have two dimensions. It would entitle the physician to an appeal
to health plan management, and it would allow a tort remedy.
This procedure would result in litigation, but measures could be
taken to minimize frivolous cases.
